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Abstract
This thesis contributes to economic research in microfinance and behavioural eco-
nomics and bridges the gap between the two fields. Chapter 2 compares three lending
mechanisms used by microfinance organizations: individual lending, simultaneous
group lending and sequential group lending. The results are that the optimal choice
of lending mechanism depends on the underlying distribution of project returns and
on the level of available official contract enforcement. If contract enforcement is
weak, sequential group lending unambiguously achieves the highest repayment rate.
Hence sequential group lending can operate in settings in which simultaneous group
lending and individual lending are not feasible due to weak contract enforcement.
Chapter 3 shows that multiple price lists, currently the standard way of eliciting
time preferences, will give biased estimates when income is uncertain. This is first
shown theoretically and the resulting hypotheses are then tested empirically. The
experiment finds that income risk causes participants to make more patient choices
when choosing between two payments in the future. When choosing between an
immediate and a future payment, however, income risk has no significant effect. As
a result, participants with uncertain income appear more present-biased and less
future-biased. Finally, only estimates obtained under safe income show a significant
correlation with real-world financial outcomes.
The fourth chapter shows how several features of the microfinance industry can
be explained by projection bias over habit formation. Humans have a tendency to
3
4underestimate to what extent their future preferences will differ from their current
preferences and this systematic bias is known as projection bias. With the help of a
formal model, this paper demonstrates that the prevalence of flat interest rate calcu-
lations, the high frequency of repayments, and the problem of over-investment can
all be explained by this particular bias. Importantly, the policy implications result-
ing from this theory differ from those of other prevailing models, such as hyperbolic
discounting.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Over the last two decades, microfinance has captured the interest and imagination
of economic researchers and policy makers alike. What started off with one man
giving small loans to poor women in Bangladesh, has matured into an industry
valued at more than $60 billion in 2010 (de Quidt et al. (2012)). Innovative and
unconventional lending mechanisms used by microfinance banks have ensured high
repayment rates and have been extensively studied by economists (Varian (1990),
Stiglitz (1990), Ghatak (2000), Besley and Coate (1995) to name just a few). The
success of microfinance culminated in the Nobel Peace Prize for Mohammed Yunnus
and the Grameen Bank of Bangladesh in 2006. In recent years, however, criticisms
of the sector have emerged, arguing that interest rates are too high, that borrowers
take on more loans than they can repay and that there is no impact on poverty
alleviation. Banerjee et al. (2010), the first randomized impact evaluation, indeed
finds no impact on poverty reduction, gender gap, health or education.
At the same time, economics has re-discovered the psychological influence in hu-
man decision making and the discipline of behavioural economics has begun to estab-
lish itself in mainstream economic thought (Camerer (2002), Angner and Loewen-
stein (2007)). Economists are increasingly incorporating cognitive biases and limita-
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tions into their models and particularly in the field of development economics, this
is beginning to shape economic policy as well. Insights from behavioural economics
in development have been used to explain phenomena as diverse as under-utilization
of mosquito nets and fertilizers (Blackburn et al. (2009), Duflo et al. (2008)) and
under-saving Ashraf et al. (2006).
This thesis contributes to both these literatures and aims to connect the two
fields wherever possible. The focus of Chapter 2 is on microfinance and in particular
on a lending mechanism which has received comparatively little attention in the
academic literature. It compares a sequential group lending mechanism, in which
borrowers receive credit one at a time, to the traditionally considered simultaneous
lending mechanism as well as individual lending. It argues that the sequential lending
mechanism has the ability to harness social sanctions more effectively than either
the traditional, simultaneous group lending mechanism or individual lending. Thus,
sequential group lending can be successfully employed in environments in which
tradition lending mechanisms break down.
The third chapter of this thesis shows that techniques used by behavioural
economists cannot always be directly transfered to a developing country setting.
In particular, it demonstrates that the standard way of eliciting discount param-
eters and time-inconsistencies is not robust to income risk, something which is a
very important part of the financial lives of the poor (Collins et al. (2009)). Two
theoretical models, based on expected utility theory and loss aversion, are used to
show that the estimates of discount factors will be biased under income risk. The re-
sulting hypotheses are then tested empirically on data collected during a laboratory
experiment in West Bengal, India. The experiment confirms that the estimation
of both discount factors and time inconsistency is affected by income risk and the
results correspond broadly to the predictions made by the loss aversion model and
reject the expected utility theory model.
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The fourth and final chapter focuses on one particular behavioural bias and
analyses how this bias can explain several features of the microfinance industry.
Evidence from psychology suggests that humans have a general tendency to con-
sistently and predictably underestimate to what extent their future preferences will
differ from their current preferences and this bias has become known as projection
bias (Loewenstein et al. (2003)). Chapter 4 makes projection bias over habit forma-
tion its main focus and analyzes, with the help of a formal model, the implications
this bias has for the microfinance industry. The model is able to show why borrowers
may over-invest, why repayment meetings in microfinance are very frequent and why
borrowers often pay very high repayment rates.
Chapter 2
Sequential Group Lending: A
Mechanism to Raise the
Repayment Rate in
Microfinance
Abstract
This paper compares three lending mechanisms used by microfinance organizations:
individual lending, simultaneous group lending and sequential group lending. The
main results of the paper are that the optimal choice of lending mechanism depends
on the underlying distribution of project returns and on the level of available official
contract enforcement. If contract enforcement is weak, sequential group lending un-
ambiguously achieves the highest repayment rate. Hence sequential group lending
can operate in settings in which simultaneous group lending and individual lending
are not feasible due to weak contract enforcement. Simultaneous group lending in
contrast achieves the highest repayment rate if the level of official contract enforce-
ment is high and if the likelihood of default is relatively low.
Keywords: Joint Liability, Sequential Financing, Social Sanctions, Microfinance
JEL Codes: O2, O12, G20, D82
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2.1 Introduction
Group lending, a feature found in many microfinance programmes all over the world,
was once celebrated as a great innovation in the global fight against poverty. It was
argued that group lending would induce borrowers to monitor each other (Stiglitz
(1990), Conning (1999) and Varian (1990)), screen each other (Ghatak (2000) and
Van Tassel (1999)) and enforce repayment when official enforcement is weak (Besley
and Coate (1995)). In recent years, however, group lending has started to disappear
as microfinance institutions have moved instead towards individual lending (Gine
and Karlan (2006)).
This paper demonstrates how an alternative lending mechanism, sequential group
lending, can be used to raise the repayment rate when the lender’s ability to enforce
contracts is low. The group lending mechanism as traditionally considered is one of
simultaneous group lending in which all the borrowers in a group receive their loans
at the same time and then are jointly liable for each other’s repayment. Sequential
group lending, the original group lending mechanism used by the Grameen Bank in
Bangladesh, in contrast, entails giving loans to borrowers one at a time on condition
that the previous borrower’s loan is repaid.
The incentive implications of sequential group lending have previously been stud-
ied by Roy Chowdhury (2005) and (2007) and Aniket (2005). Roy Chowdhury (2005)
shows that if monitoring and effort decisions are strategic complements then simul-
taneous group lending can break down. By distributing loans sequentially, borrowers
will always have an incentive to monitor each other. Roy Chowdhury (2007) demon-
strates how sequential group lending can lead to assortative matching and homoge-
neous group formation, thus making it cheaper for the lender to screen borrowers.
Similarly, Aniket (2005) shows how sequentiality can help to alleviate the problem
of moral hazard in effort provision. By temporally separating the monitoring and
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the effort decision of a group member, the lender has to incentivise only one task
per borrower at a time.
This paper shows that there are two further advantages to sequential group
lending as compared to simultaneous group lending: the first advantage is that,
unlike under simultaneous group lending, it is never the case that one borrower’s
default can cause another borrower to default. Under simultaneous group lending the
joint repayment burden can be so high that a borrower who would have repaid her
own loan will choose not to repay for two and hence herself defaults. Under sequential
group lending each borrower has to take the repayment decision individually. The
logical corollary, however, is that borrowers also will not be able to help each other
as much as they can under simultaneous group lending. A borrower who has not yet
received a loan will not be in a position to help a group member who is struggling
to repay. The choice of optimal lending mechanism is therefore a function of the
underlying distribution of output. This tradeoff is analysed in section 3.
The second advantage is that sequential group lending is more efficient at har-
nessing social sanctions between borrowers. As borrowers wait their turn to be
allocated their loan, they threaten their partner with social sanctions should they
voluntarily default. Similarly, once borrowers have repaid their share of the loan,
they will pressure their peer into repaying, else they would be liable for repayment of
a second loan or face the lender’s official penalty for not repaying on their partner’s
behalf. In simultaneous group lending, in contrast, it may occur that both borrowers
agree to default on the loan and hence no social sanctions are used. In environments
where the lender’s available penalty for defaulting is particularly low and hence
where official contract enforcement is weak, sequential group lending therefore may
be the only mechanism under which lending remains feasible. Section 4 analyses this
problem in detail.
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2.2 Applications
The idea of harnessing social sanctions using sequential group lending is not new.
Rotating savings and credit associations (ROSCAs) are based on a very similar
principle. A ROSCA is a group of people who each contribute a specific amount to a
savings pot in each period. The money thus accumulated is randomly allocated to a
winner. The ROSCA continues with the winner of the pot excluded from receiving
the pot in the future and it terminates when every single member has received the
pot once.
Without social pressure from other ROSCA members, there would be little in-
centive to keep on contributing after a member has won the pot1 . Besley et al.
(1993) argue that it is the social connectedness amongst the group members and the
threat of social sanctions which insure against such default problems. In this paper
we argue that the sequentiality observed in ROSCAs is crucial and that the same
mechanism can be exploited by microfinance institutions.
However financial products in developing countries are not the only possible
application of this sequential mechanism. Any production process which involves
two separate tasks can be carried out in either a sequential or a simultaneous fashion.
Bag and Roy (2011) for example, compare contributions in a public good game in
sequential and simultaneous frameworks and find that the sequential set-up may lead
to higher expected total contributions. The analysis in this paper can be seen as
contributing to this emerging literature on sequential mechanisms (see also Winter
(2006), Bessen and Maskin (2009)) by showing that social pressure is strongest in a
sequential framework.
1For a recent and very interesting behavioural explanation see Basu (2011)
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2.3 Perfect Enforcement
This section compares the repayment rates of individual lending, simultaneous group
lending and sequential group lending under perfect contract enforcement. Perfect
contract enforcement is defined as the ability to guarantee repayment if the bor-
rower’s output is at least as high as the amount owed to the bank. Alternatively, it
is the lender’s ability to directly confiscate whatever it is owed.
Borrowers are risk neutral and have access to projects which require one unit of
capital and each yield x units of income where x is independently and identically
distributed on [0, x] with a continuous distribution function F (x). Borrowers are
wealth less and therefore must borrow capital from a lender who requires a repayment
of r > 1 after the project has been realized. This repayment of r is treated as
exogenously given for the purpose of this paper. The upper bound on project returns
x is assumed to be greater than r so that repayment is feasible in at least some
states of the world. Later on we will distinguish between the case where x > 2r and
r < x < 2r such that a borrower may or may not be able to repay her partner’s loan
as well as her own.
To make matters simple, this paper ignores partial repayment. If a borrower’s
output falls short of the required repayment, the borrower is said to be in default
and the bank receives nothing. 2
The main object of interest throughout the paper is the expected repayment rate,
which is defined as the number of loans that are expected to be repaid per group
relative to the number of loans that are expected to be made.
2This assumption does not affect any of the results of the paper in any meaningful way. For
example, one could also assume a degenerate distribution in which output can take only three values:
‘zero’, ‘medium’, and ‘high’, such that partial repayment is not possible. Assuming ‘medium’ is
sufficient just to repay one loan and ‘high’ is sufficient to repay two loans, the results in this paper
are equally valid.
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2.3.1 Individual Lending
Individual lending under perfect enforcement simply consists of the borrower repay-
ing whenever output exceeds r. Therefore the expected repayment rate equals:
Π∗ind = 1− F (r) (2.1)
2.3.2 Simultaneous Group Lending
Groups are composed of two borrowers B1 and B2. The group is allocated two units
of capital and both group members are jointly liable for the repayment of the two
loans at the end of the period. The assumption of no partial repayment implies that
a group member can repay for her peer only if her output exceeds 2r. For example
if one borrower has a return of 0.5r and the other has a return of 1.5r, the group
is still said to be in default. This is purely to simplify the analysis; relaxing this
assumption would not affect the results of this paper in a meaningful way.
There are four different states of the world:
State of the world Probability Loans
repaid
Case 1 Both borrowers have a return less
than r
F (r)2 0/2
Case 2 One borrower has a return less than
r while the other has a return be-
tween r and 2r
2F (r)
(
F (2r)− F (r)) 0/2
Case 3 Both borrowers have a return
greater than r
(
1− F (r))2 2/2
Case 4 One borrower has a return less than
r while the other borrower has a re-
turn greater than 2r
2F (r)
(
1− F (2r)) 2/2
In case 2, simultaneous group lending performs worse than individual lending
because one borrower is dragged into default by her struggling partner. In case 4, in
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contrast, simultaneous group lending is beneficial because a defaulting borrower can
be bailed out by her partner. Which of these effects outweighs the other depends on
the relative likelihood of each of the cases occurring. If case 4, for example, never
occurs because it is not possible for one borrower to have a return greater than
2r then individual lending is unambiguously better. In general however, it is not
possible to say which of the two mechanisms achieves the highest repayment rate.
The overall repayment rate in simultaneous group lending is given by
Π∗sim = 1− F (r)2 − 2F (r)
(
F (2r)− F (r)). (2.2)
The first term that is subtracted is simply the probability of state 1 occurring and
the second term the probability of state 2 occurring, which are the only cases in
which the loan is not repaid.
2.3.3 Sequential Group Lending
Under sequential group lending initially only B1 is given a loan and upon the suc-
cessful repayment of it B2 will receive the second loan. Hence every group receives
the first loan, but the second loan is given out only with probability 1−F (r). With
probability F (r) the first loan could not be repaid and hence the game terminates.
Overall, the expected number of units of capital lent per group therefore is given by
2−F (r). To calculate how many loans are expected to be repaid, consider the four
possible states of the world:
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State of the world Probability Loans
repaid
Case 1 B1 has a return less than r F (r) 0/1
Case 2 B1’s output is in [r, 2r) and B2’s
output is less than r
F (r)
(
F (2r)− F (r)) 1/2
Case 3 B1’s output is greater than r and
B2’s output is greater than r
(
1− F (r))2 2/2
Case 4 B1’s return is greater than 2r while
B2’s return is less than r
F (r)
(
1− F (2r)) 2/2
Nothing will be repaid if B1 has a return less than r and the game terminates.
Only one of the two loans will be repaid if B1 has a return greater than r but less
than 2r while B2 has a return less than r. Both loans will be repaid in either of two
cases: both have a return greater than r or B1 has a return greater than 2r. The
overall expected repayment is therefore given by:
1× F (r)[F (2r)− F (r)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Case 2
+2× [1− F (r)]2︸ ︷︷ ︸
Case 3
+2× F (r)[1− F (2r)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Case 4
(2.3)
and hence the expected repayment rate under sequential group lending is given by
Π∗seq =
F (r)[F (2r)− F (r)] + 2F (r)[1 − F (2r)] + 2[1− F (r)]2
2− F (r)
Π∗seq = 1− F (r) +
F (r)
(
1− F (2r))
2− F (r) (2.4)
Another way to think about this repayment rate is that it is a weighted average of
the repayment rate of B1, which is simply 1− F (r), and the repayment rate of B2,
which is higher due to the fact that B1 may repay for B2. Proposition 1 therefore
follows immediately:
Proposition 1. With perfect enforcement the repayment rate under sequential group
lending is greater or equal to the repayment rate under individual lending
Proof. follows directly from comparing equations (2.1) and (4).
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The intuition behind this result is that under sequential group lending the first
borrower can be asked to help the second borrower repay, yet there is no negative
contagion effect that one borrower can drag the other into default, as may occur
with simultaneous group lending.
2.3.4 Comparative Statics: The Distribution of Project Returns
Assuming a specific functional form for the distribution of output allows for a more
explicit comparison of the three lending mechanisms. With F (x) = xx and x ≥ r the
repayment rates can be expressed as a function of the distribution of output (x):
π∗sim(r/x) =


1− 3r2/x2 if x ≥ 2r
1− 2r/x+ r2/x2 if x < 2r
π∗seq(r/x) =


1− r/x+ r/x(1−2r/x)2−r/x if x ≥ 2r
1− r/x if x < 2r
π∗ind(r/x) = 1− r/x
These repayment rates can easily be plotted as a function of r/x, as shown in
Figure 1. Part (a) depicts the individual repayment rate versus the simultaneous
group lending repayment rate, part (b) depicts individual versus sequential group
lending repayment rates and part (c) combines all three lending mechanisms in one
figure.
As x falls and hence the ratio r/x increases, it becomes less and less likely that
borrowers will be able to repay. At r/x = 1 it is impossible to repay even a single
loan because the upper bound on project returns is equal to the required repayment.
Given the assumption of a uniform distribution, the midpoint, r/2x, is the thresh-
old point such that to the right of it, it will be impossible to repay two loans (x < 2r).
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To the left of the midpoint it becomes more and more likely that a borrower will
be able to repay for two loans. Towards the origin, as x becomes arbitrarily large
relative to r and default therefore becomes impossible, the repayment rate rises all
the way to 1.
The ratio r/x therefore captures both how likely it is that a borrower can repay
her own loan and how likely it is that a borrower can repay for two loans. We can
hence analyse the repayment rates as a function of r/x so as to understand how
different distributions affect the repayment rate.
Figure 2.1: The repayment rates as functions of r/x given x is uniformly distributed.
The closer r/x is to 1 the more likely involuntary default becomes.
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From Figure 1 we see that for different ranges of r/x, different lending mech-
anisms are optimal. For very high values of x relative to r, simultaneous group
lending achieves the highest repayment rate. For intermediate values, sequential
group lending is optimal and for lower values of x, both sequential group lending
and individual lending are identical and achieve the highest repayment rate. Since
sequential group lending always performs better or the same as individual lending,
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we can limit our analysis to comparing the two group lending mechanisms.
Proposition 2. For x uniformly distributed on some [x, x], there exist x˜ such that
for all x ≥ x˜ simultaneous group lending achieves the highest repayment rate and
for all values of x < x˜ sequential group lending achieves the highest repayment rate
Proof. • For x < 2r, π∗seq > π∗sim since 1− 2r/x+ r2x2 < 1− r/x for x < 2r
• For x ≥ 2r, π∗seq < π∗sim if 1− 3r2/x2 > 1− r/x+ r/x(1−2x)2−r/x which has solution:
0 < r/x < 16(5−
√
13)
Hence for all x ≥ 6r
(5−
√
13)
, π∗sim ≥ π∗seq and for all x < 6r(5−√13) , π∗seq > π∗sim
The intuition behind this result is that as default becomes more likely, the con-
tagion effect inherent in simultaneous group lending outweighs the benefit of being
able to mutually assist each other and thus sequential group lending is preferable.
However, whenever default is less likely, the mutual insurance aspect of simultaneous
group lending outweighs the potential threat of contagion.
This section has demonstrated that allowing for involuntary default re-opens
the original problem that making borrowers jointly liable for each other may cause
borrowers to be dragged into default by their partners as well as inducing them to
help each other. It has also offered a solution in the form of sequential group lending,
since this will always improve the repayment rate relative to individual lending,
regardless of the distribution of output. The sequential group lending mechanism has
completely eliminated the situation in which one borrower’s low output realization
can cause her partner to be in default as well by temporally separating the repayment
decisions.
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2.4 Imperfect Enforcement
This section analyses how the three mechanisms compare in their ability to induce
repayment when contract enforcement is weak. Under incomplete contract enforce-
ment, the ability of the mechanism to harness social sanctions in order to complement
the incomplete official penalty becomes crucial.
The framework used in this section builds on the seminal work by Besley and
Coate (1995), who first studied how group lending can help mitigate the problem of
weak contract enforcement. The subsections on simultaneous group lending briefly
summarise the main result on simultaneous group lending from their paper, in order
to compare simultaneous group lending to sequential group lending.
Under imperfect enforcement the borrower has a choice whether or not to repay
after the project has been realized. If she chooses to repay she will be able to keep
her project’s return minus the repayment and if she chooses to default, she faces a
penalty from the lender in the form of expropriation of part of her project’s return.3
Imperfect contract enforcement is modelled as the lender’s ability to seize only a
fraction (1/β) < 1 of the produced output. Alternatively, one can think of 1/β as
the probability with which the bank manages to seize the output of a defaulting
borrower, for example due to weak property rights. 4
Joint liability is defined as follows: if both borrowers have a return greater than
r and either defaults, both will be penalised by the lender and each loses a fraction
(1/β) of her output. If one borrower has a return greater than 2r while her partner
has a return less than r then she will be penalised if she does not repay for both
3Throughout this paper the term penalty is used for the lender’s imperfect contract enforcement
ability. It is the punishment that the lender can inflict on the borrower for not repaying. The term
sanction is reserved for social sanctions, which originate from other group members only.
4Assuming a linear functional form is a significant simplification of Besley and Coate’s original
‘penalty function’ which is simply increasing in output. In reality this penalty function is likely
a combination of many penalties, notably also the exclusion of future access to credit. As long
as these additional penalties enter additively and as long as the overall penalty function remains
increasing in output, the results of this paper directly go through.
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loans. The partner who has a return less than r will not be penalised. Hence we
again abstract from partial repayment and focus on the case where a borrower must
have an output realization greater than 2r to be expected to help her partner.
2.4.1 Social Sanctions
Under joint liability one borrower’s decision to voluntarily default may represent a
negative externality on a group member who would like to repay the loan. She will
either have to bail out her defaulting partner or she will be penalised by the bank
for defaulting along with her partner. This negative externality creates the potential
for the lender to leverage social sanctions as an additional penalty. In practice these
social sanctions can take many forms, ranging from social isolation and reporting
the bad behaviour to other members of the community to physical retribution.
We make three important assumptions about social sanctions:
1. Social sanctions are applied only if the decision to default actually represents
a negative externality to the other group member. If a borrower’s default does
not affect her partner’s payoff then there will be no social sanctions for it.
2. a group member who voluntarily defaults on a repayment will face social sanc-
tions s from her peers, while a borrower who is known to have defaulted
through no fault of her own will be spared from sanctions. That is:
s(xi) =


s if xi ≥ r
0 if xi < r
(3) Social sanctions are strong enough to induce repayment in a borrower who has
enough funds to repay (s > r).
It is important to note that the second assumption relies on the fact the group
members can perfectly observe each other’s project output and therefore know if a
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default was voluntary or involuntary. This is a common assumption in the literature
as microfinance clients, in rural settings in particular, tend know a lot about each
other. However, it does mean that the analysis here will be less applicable to urban
settings or to settings in which groups are exogenously formed and where group
members may have very little knowledge of each other.
Although in practice the degree to which group members sanction each other may
depend on several factors, we focus on the case where group members either sanction
their partner s or not at all. One could also imagine that social sanctions may be
an increasing function in the amount of damage caused by a voluntary default.
Alternatively, they could be an increasing function of how close the borrower was
to being able to repay her loan. None of the results in this paper are substantially
affected if social sanctions are modelled in these ways. All that is needed for the
results to hold is that social sanctions inflict an additional cost to defaulting.
Further, one could also imagine that a group member can be sanctioned, although
presumably to a lesser extent, for not bailing out a partner who cannot afford to
repay her loan. In the current model this is assumed not to be the case because no
damage is inflicted on anyone other than the lender. The defaulting partner would
gain nothing by being bailed out, because she faces no penalty from defaulting and
the game ends at the end of the period. This is of course a simplification; as in
reality the game is likely to be repeated and this may be an interesting avenue for
further research. 5
2.4.2 Individual Lending
The borrower will repay her loan if the payoff from doing so is greater than the payoff
from defaulting: x− r > x− (1/β)x that is if βr < x. The expected repayment rate
5In case of a voluntary default on behalf of the second borrower, she would however benefit from
being bailed out by her partner and would therefore also sanction her peer for not doing so. In
equilibrium however this will never happen.
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for individual lending is therefore
πind = 1− F (βr) (2.5)
Since β > 1 the repayment rate under weak enforcement is clearly lower than under
perfect enforcement, as one would expect. For all output realizations in [r, βr] the
borrower defaults although she technically has enough funds to repay the loan. The
remainder of the paper therefore distinguishes between voluntary default, which
occurs when a borrower could repay but chooses not to, and involuntary default,
which occurs when a borrower cannot repay because her output realization is less
than r.
2.4.3 Simultaneous Group Lending
As in the previous section, both borrowers receive a loan and are jointly responsible
for repaying it at the end of the period. Borrowers will choose to repay if and only
if the payoff from repaying is greater than the payoff from defaulting, i.e. they will
repay if x > βr if they are not being sanctioned by their peer and they will repay
for all x > r if they are being sanctioned.
Decisions are made non-cooperatively and group members have no means of side
contracting amongst themselves. There are five possible states of the world:
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State of the world Probability Loans
repaid
Case 1 Both borrowers have a return less
than βr and hence choose to default
F (βr)2 0/2
Case 2 One borrower’s output is greater
than βr and the other borrower’s
output is in [r, βr)
2
(
1 − F (βr)) ×(
F (βr)− F (r)) 2/2
Case 3 One borrower’s output is in
[βr, 2βr) and the other borrower’s
output is less than r
2 F (r)
(
F (2βr)− F (βr))0/2
Case 4 One borrower’s output is greater
than 2βr while the other borrower’s
output is less than r
2F (r)
(
1− F (2βr)) 2/2
Case 5 Both borrowers have a output
greater than βr
(
1− F (βr))2 2/2
In case 1 borrowers are in agreement that the loan should not be repaid and
hence the group collectively decides to default. Cases 2 and 3 have the borrowers in
disagreement on whether or not the loan should be repaid, with the difference that
in case 2 social sanctions will induce the borrower with low output to repay, while
in case 3 her output is too low and the group is forced to default. Case 4 describes
the scenario in which one borrower can pay for her partner who is unable to repay
and case 5 represents the case when the borrowers are in agreement to repay the
loan. 6 Case 2 is the only case in which the existence of social sanctions improves
the repayment rate; in all four other states of the world social sanctions do not
encourage repayment.
6Note that in case 5, if neither borrower has a return greater than 2βr, there are potentially two
equilibria: both borrowers can coordinate on repaying but both borrowers can also coordinate on
defaulting. Besley and Coate (1995) assume that borrowers manage to coordinate on the pareto
superior equilibrium where both repay. While this is probably a reasonable assumption, it is worth
noting that this potential coordination failure disappears under sequential group lending. This was
first observed by Ray (1999) and is not unlike the contribution by Roy Chowdhury (2005), who
makes a similar point about monitoring.
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The repayment rate hence will be:
Πsim = 1− [F (βr)]2 − 2F (r)[F (β2r) − F (βr)] (2.6)
The first term which is subtracted is simply the probability of state 1 occurring
and the second term the probability of state 3, which are the only cases when the
loan is not repaid. Again it is not clear that simultaneous group lending outperforms
individual lending. Cases 2 and 4 increase the repayment rate relative to individual
lending by either inducing a defaulting borrower to repay in order to avoid social
sanctions or by inducing one borrower to repay her partner’s loan as well as her own.
Case 3 instead involves one borrower dragging her partner into default because she
cannot or does not want to pay for two loans but she would have repaid for one.
The reader who is familiar with the original Besley and Coate (1995) article
may be surprised to see this result. Besley and Coate (1995) find that whenever
social sanctions are sufficiently strong, simultaneous group lending always achieves
a repayment rate at least as high as individual lending (Proposition 3). However,
this proposition was based on the assumption that all default is voluntary, that is,
that project returns are all greater than r.
2.4.4 Sequential Group Lending
In the first period only B1 receives a loan and in the second period B2 will receive
a loan conditional on B1 having repaid. If B2 does not repay there will be a third
period in which B1 has the option to bail out her partner.
There are three different cases depending on the first borrower’s output realiza-
tion:
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x1 < r
If the project return of the first borrower is less than r the game ends in the first
period, no further loan is given to the group and there are no social sanctions. This
happens with probability F (r).
x1 ∈ [r, 2r)
In this case the repayment game will be a two-stage game. In the first period B1
decides whether to repay her loan and in the second period B2 decides whether to
repay her loan.
As a standard sequential move game, this is solved by backwards induction:
t=2 If B2’s output is greater than r the lender will penalise both borrowers should
B2 choose to default. B2’s payoff from defaulting therefore is x2− s− (1/β)x2
and her payoff from repaying is x2 − r. Hence B2 will repay for all x2 > r
t=1 B1’s payoff from repaying is simply x1−r regardless of B2’s output realization.
If x2 > r the second borrower will repay her loan and if x2 < r B1 will not be
penalised by the lender for being unable to pay for two loans. The payoff from
defaulting, however is x1− s− (1/β)x1 and hence the first borrower will repay
for all x1 > r as well.
x1 ≥ 2r
In this case the repayment game will be a three-period game with the added third
period in which B1 chooses whether or not to bail out her partner. The structure of
this game is depicted in Figure (2). Again, this game will be solved by backwards
induction:
t=3 The payoff for B1 from bailing out B2 is always x1 − 2r. The payoff from
not bailing out her partner will depend on B2’s output realization. As long as
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Figure 2.2: The Sequential Repayment game for the case where x1 ≥ 2r and x2 > r.
s(xi) is the social sanction function defined earlier.
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B1
x2 − r
x1 − r − s(x1)− 1/β(x1 − r)
x2 − s(x2)− 1/βx2
x2 < r there will be no social sanctions if B1 does not bail out B2, since B2
is not harmed by B1’s decision not to bail her out. However, the bank will
confiscate a fraction 1/β of B1’s remaining output (x1− r). Hence B1 will bail
out B2 if and only if:
x1 − 2r ≥ (x1 − r)− (1/β)(x1 − r)
x1 ≥ (1 + β)r
If x2 ≥ r and B2 did not repay her loan, then B1 not bailing out B2 would lower
B2’s utility and hence B2 would sanction B1. That is, the second borrower
would effectively be able to blackmail the first borrower into bailing her out.
However, B2 blackmailing B1 into bailing her out clearly also lowers B1’s payoff
and hence is socially sanctioned as well. Hence, in equilibrium B1 never has
to bail out B1 if x2 > r.
t=2 B2’s payoff from repaying is x2 − r and from defaulting it is x2 − s− (1/β)x2.
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Hence B2 will repay for all x2 > r.
t=1 B1’s payoff from defaulting is x1 − s − (1/β)x1. The payoff from repaying is
calculated as follows: with probability F (r), B2 will default and hence B1 will
either have to bail her out or will be penalised by the lender for not doing so
since her output is high enough to cover both loans. The expected payoff from
repaying therefore is:
• x1− r−F (r)r for x1 ≥ (1+ β)r in which case she will repay on behalf of
her partner
• x1 − r − F (r)(1/β)(x1 − r) for x1 ∈ [2r, (1 + β)r) in which case she will
be penalised by the lender for not repaying on behalf of her partner
Comparing the payoff in either of these cases to the payoff from defaulting, we
find that B1 will also repay in the first period for all x1 ≥ r. 7
To calculate the expected repayment, the repayment decisions are summarized
below:
State of the world Probability Loans
repaid
Case 1 B1 has a return less than r F (r) 0/1
Case 2 B1 has a return in [r, (1 + β)r) and
B2 has a return less than r
F (r)[F ((1 + β)r) −
F (r)]
1/2
Case 3 Both borrowers have a return
greater than r
[1− F (r)]2 2/2
Case 4 B1’s return is greater than (1 + β)r
while B2’s output is less than r
F (r)[1− F ((1 + β)r)] 2/2
7For x1 ≥ (1 + β)r we have x1 − r − F (r)r ≥ x1 − s − (1/β)x1, which simplifies to x1 ≥
β(r − s + rF (r)) and which we know will always hold for x1 ≥ (1 + β)r and s > r. For the case
x1 ∈ [2r, (1+β)r) the condition to ensure repayment is given by x1−r−F (r)(x1−r) ≥ x1−s−(1/β)x1
which simplifies to x1 ≥ r − s+ F (r)(x1 − r) which also always holds for s > r.
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The overall expected repayment is therefore given by:
1× F (r)[F ((1 + β)r)− F (r)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Case 2
+2× [1− F (r)]2︸ ︷︷ ︸
Case 3
+2× F (r)[1− F ((1 + β)r)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Case 4
. (2.7)
The expected number of units of capital lent out per group is still given by 2−F (r)
since the first borrower still repays the first loan whenever her output exceeds r.
Hence the expected repayment rate is given by
Πseq =
F (r)[F ((1 + β))r)− F (r)] + 2F (r)[1− F ((1 + β)r)] + 2[1− F (r)]2
2− F (r)
Πseq = 1− F (r) +
F (r)[1− F ((1 + β)r)]
2− F (r) (2.8)
Proposition 3. The expected repayment rate under sequential group lending, re-
gardless of the level of contract enforcement, is always greater than or equal to the
expected repayment rate under individual lending and perfect enforcement.
Proof. Follows directly from comparing Equations (1) and (8).
This result stems from the fact that under sequential group lending peer pressure
will always induce repayment if possible and for some states of the world it will also
induce the first borrower to repay on behalf of her partner. If the first borrower de-
faults, the second borrower never receives a loan and if the second borrower defaults
then either the first borrower must repay on her behalf, or be penalised by the bank
for not doing so. This negative externality on the first borrower triggers social sanc-
tions also when the second borrower defaults voluntarily. Voluntary default hence
always harms the other group member and hence always triggers social sanctions.
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2.4.5 Comparative Statics: Contract Enforcement
This section compares the three lending mechanisms for varying levels of contract
enforcement holding constant the distribution of output. As in the previous section
on perfect contract enforcement, a uniform distribution of project returns is assumed,
but once again the analysis could be repeated for other distribution functions. Using
F (x) = x/x the repayment rates as a function of the inverse of the lender’s penalty
β and hence the weakness of contract enforcement can be expressed as:
πsim(β) =


1− β2r2/x2 − 2βr2/x2 if β ≤ x/2r
1− β2r2/x2 − 2r/x[1− βr/x] if β > x/2r
πseq(β) =


1− r/x+ r/x(1−(1+β)r/x)2−r/x if β ≤ (x− r)/r
1− r/x if β > (x− r)/r
πind(β) = 1− r/x
The threshold β = x/2r for simultaneous group lending is the minimum amount
of penalty required such that for all β greater than this no borrower will ever be
willing to repay two loans. Similarly the threshold β > (x−r)/r for sequential group
lending is the minimum amount of penalty such that the first borrower may bail out
her partner after having repaid her own loan in the first period.
As has been demonstrated in the previous section, the relative performance of
these repayment rates depends not only on β but also on r/x. Proposition 2 demon-
strated that for all x ≥ x˜ and β = 1 simultaneous group lending has a higher
repayment rate and for all x < x˜ the converse holds. We therefore distinguish
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between these two different cases here as well.
Figures 3 and 4 plot the repayment rate as a function of β for both cases:
0
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r
β
πsim
πind
πseq
Figure 2.3: The repayment rates as a function of β plotted for x ≥ x˜. For very high
values of β simultaneous group lending has the highest repayment rate, but for all
β ≥ β˜ sequential group lending has the highest repayment rate.
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Figure 2.4: The repayment rates as a function of β plotted for x < x˜. For all levels
of β sequential group lending has the highest repayment rate.
In the first case, simultaneous group lending has a higher repayment rate for high
levels of contract enforcement (low β) but quickly drops below sequential group lend-
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ing as the level of contract enforcement declines. In the second case, sequential group
lending always has the highest repayment rate, for all levels of contract enforcement.
Proposition 4. If project returns are uniformly distributed on some [x, x], there
exists a β˜ > 1 such that for all β ≥ β˜ we have πseq ≥ πsim and πseq ≥ πind.
Proof: A formal proof is left for the appendix, but the intuition follows directly
from Figures 3 and 4.
The intuition is once again that sequential group lending is more efficient at
leveraging social sanctions. Unlike simultaneous borrowers, sequential borrowers al-
ways threaten to sanction each other because there is always a negative consequence
from a partner’s voluntary default. With simultaneous group lending however, it
can be the case that both borrowers are in agreement that the loan should not be
repaid and hence they can jointly decide to default. Thus, a voluntary default always
triggers social sanctions under sequential group lending but not under simultaneous
group lending.
2.4.6 Minimum Amount of Enforcement Required
Sequential group lending is the most efficient at harnessing social sanctions and
therefore will be most useful in circumstances where the enforcement ability of the
lender is particularly weak. This subsection demonstrates that the minimum amount
of contract enforcement required for the credit market to function is lower under
sequential group lending than under any other lending mechanism.
For the lender to be able to operate, the following zero profit condition must be
satisfied
π ∗ r ≥ ρ
where ρ is the opportunity cost of capital and r is the exogenously given interest rate.
The lender is therefore able to operate only if he achieves a minimum repayment
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rate of πmin = ρ/r. The opportunity cost of credit, ρ, is assumed to be low enough
that individual lending under perfect enforcement is feasible, that is r(1− r/x) > ρ.
Under individual lending the minimum amount of penalty needed is therefore
given by:
r(1− βr/x) = ρ
⇒ βminind =
(r − ρ)x
r2
(2.9)
Under simultaneous group lending the minimum amount of penalty required is
given by:
(
1− β2r2/x2 − 2βr2/x2)r = ρ
⇒ β2 + 2β − (r − ρ)x
2
r3
= 0
which is a quadratic in β and has solution given by:
βminsim = −1±
√
1 +
(r − ρ)x2
r3
(2.10)
Proposition 5. There exists an x′ such that for all x ≥ x′ the minimum penalty
required for simultaneous group lending is lower than for individual lending (βminsim ≥
βminind ). The converse holds for all x < x
′.
Proof. The proof follows directly from comparing the expressions for βminsim and β
min
ind
and is worked out in the appendix.
The intuition for this result is that for high values of x it is more likely that
borrowers will be able to assist each other in the repayment of their loans; hence the
repayment rate increases. This in turn implies that the required penalty to obtain
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a certain repayment rate is lower for high values of x.
Similarly, for low values of x individual lending has a higher repayment rate than
simultaneous group lending because one borrower dragging the other borrower into
default is more likely. This in turn means the required penalty for simultaneous
group lending has to be greater to compensate for the higher incidence of default.
For sequential group lending to be feasible the following requirement on β has
to be met:
(
1− r/x+ F (r)[1− F
(
(1 + β)r
)
]
2− F (r)
)
r ≥ ρ (2.11)
which holds for all values of β ≥ 1.
Proposition 6. The minimum amount of official penalty required for sequential
group lending to be feasible is less than the minimum amount of penalty required for
either simultaneous or individual lending.
Proof. Follows directly from the fact that both (2.9) and (2.10) are greater than 1
while (2.11) holds for all β ≥ 1
Given the assumption that the opportunity cost of capital is low enough for
individual lending under perfect enforcement to be feasible, sequential group lending
can operate for extremely small levels of official penalty. The official penalty is in
this case used only to trigger the much larger social sanctions which are available in
every period. Of course, if the lender wants to achieve a repayment rate greater than
the individual lending perfect enforcement repayment rate (1 − F (r)), then further
penalty is required to induce borrowers to repay their partner’s loan as well.
This section has demonstrated that sequential group lending is the only lending
mechanism that remains feasible for very low levels of official contract enforcement.
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Sequential group lending triggers social sanctions more frequently than simultaneous
group lending and hence makes more efficient use of the available social capital.
2.5 Conclusion
This paper set out to compare and contrast three lending mechanisms commonly
observed in microfinance: individual lending, simultaneous group lending and se-
quential group lending. The main findings are that the optimal choice of lending
mechanism depends on the distribution of project returns and the amount of contract
enforcement available to the lender. Ceterus paribus, simultaneous group lending
performs best when the likelihood of default is low and the likelihood of being able to
pay for two loans is high. However, it performs worse than the other two mechanisms
when the probability of default is high.
The empirical prediction of this paper is that sequential group lending is most
likely to raise the repayment rate in settings where the lender’s enforcement ability is
low. In fact, sequential group lending is feasible in environments in which the lender
has so little enforcement ability that individual and simultaneous group lending
would be unfeasible.
It is important to note that in the real world the lender’s enforcement ability
consists of several components, ranging from the confiscation of output to threats of
legal action or withholding all future access to credit. For example, a monopolistic
moneylender who can credibly threaten to cut off borrowers from future access to
credit may still have a very strong contract enforcement ability even if he has no way
of confiscating output. That is, in such a setting the penalty function of the lender
may have the form (1/β)x + V where V represents the present discounted value of
future access to credit. Whenever this combined punishment ability of the lender is
weak, sequential group lending is likely to raise the repayment rate.
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The corporate finance literature recently has also turned to analysing the ques-
tion of joint versus individual financing of projects. Banal-Estanol et al. (2011) and
Leland (2007), for example, find, similarly to the results in this paper, that joint fi-
nancing involves a trade-off between coinsurance and risk of contamination and they
derive conditions under which individual financing is preferable to joint financing.
To the best of the author’s knowledge a sequential mechanism, as studied here, has
not yet been considered by the corporate finance literature and may be of interest
there as well.
One disadvantage of sequential group lending which is not directly analysed in
this paper is the fact that one profitable project is not financed immediately, but
instead is delayed to the next period. In microfinance this is a minor concern since
NGOs and other microfinance institutions usually have insufficient outreach and the
demand for credit tends to far outstrip the supply. However, in a setting where
enough credit is available to fund all projects immediately, sequential group lending
would introduce another inefficiency by forcing efficient projects to lie idle.
Another reason why the mechanism considered here is likely to be most appropri-
ate for microfinance is that projects tend to have a very short time to maturity and
the first instalment is almost always due just one week after the loan has been given
out. Hence the time delay before starting the second project is only a matter of a
few weeks instead of several months, as may be the case in other financial settings.
Chapter 3
Risk and Time Inconsistency:
Evidence from a Field
Experiment in West Bengal
Abstract
This study shows that multiple price lists, currently the standard way of elicit-
ing time preferences, will give biased estimates when income is uncertain. This is
first shown theoretically and the resulting hypotheses are then tested empirically.
The experiment finds that income risk causes participants to make more patient
choices when asked to choose between two payments in the future. When asked to
choose between an immediate and a future payment, however, income risk has shown
no significant effect. As a result, participants with uncertain income appear more
present-biased and less future-biased. Finally, only estimates obtained under safe
income show a significant correlation with real-world financial market outcomes.
Keywords: Hyberbolic Discounting, Field Experiment, Uncertainty
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3.1 Introduction
This chapter shows that the standard method of eliciting time preferences will yield
biased estimates in the presence of income risk. This is first shown with a theoretical
model based on which hypotheses are formed, which are then tested empirically.
Since income risk is not allocated exogenously in the field, the hypotheses were
tested experimentally with the help of a laboratory experiment in West Bengal,
India.
Time inconsistencies, and present-bias in particular, have started to receive a
lot of attention in development economics and have been linked to phenomena as
diverse as under-saving and over-borrowing (Ashraf et al. (2006), Bauer et al. (2011))
and under-utilization of mosquito nets and fertilizers (Blackburn et al. (2009), Duflo
et al. (2008)). The presence of these behavioural biases gives rise to a potential
need for direct policy intervention such as the introduction of commitment savings
accounts or time-limited subsidies for fertilizer. Eliciting time preferences correctly
therefore has direct policy relevance.
However, the challenges of eliciting time preferences of poor subjects in devel-
oping countries are very different from those of eliciting the same preferences of
undergraduates in a controlled laboratory environment. One of the main differences
between eliciting time preferences in developed and developing countries is that the
lives of the poor are full of risk and uncertainty. Choosing between an immediate
payment and a later payment will depend on more than the discount factor; in par-
ticular it will also depend on the need for insurance, which is implicitly provided by
offering a future payment.
This study formalizes this result with the help of two different theories of choice
under uncertainty. The main theoretical result is that the estimates of time prefer-
ences, as found using a standard multiple price list, will be biased if the participant
CHAPTER 3. RISK AND TIME INCONSISTENCY 44
is exposed to income risk. Specifically, two different models of choice under uncer-
tainty are compared: one of Expected Utility Theory (EUT) and one of reference
point dependence. Both models predict that income risk can bias the elicitation of
time preferences, but potentially in different directions which allows to directly test
the models against each other.
The laboratory experiment indeed confirms that income risk affects the estima-
tion of the discount factors and the results are broadly in line with the reference
point model. When choosing between immediate payments and future payments,
participants’ choices do not significantly differ whether they are exposed to income
risk or not. When choosing between future payments, however, participants make
more patient choices if they are subject to income risk. This leads to different dis-
tribution of overall biases across treatments with more present-bias (impatient now,
patient later) and less future-bias (patient now, impatient later) amongst partici-
pants exposed to income risk.
In the final section of this chapter, I correlate estimates of time inconsistency
with real world financial market outcomes. While estimates of time inconsistency
obtained in the risk free treatment group correlate significantly with outcome vari-
ables of interest, the estimates obtained under income risk do not. The fact that
income risk has affected the estimates of time preferences would largely remain a
theoretical exercise, of limited interest to practitioners and policy makers, if it did
not also affect the correlations with outcomes researchers care about. The fact that
only estimates obtained under safe income correlate significantly with financial out-
come variables is indicative evidence of the fact that risk has introduced a significant
amount of measurement error in the estimates of time inconsistency, thereby weak-
ening the accuracy of the elicited measures. Researchers and practitioners wishing to
elicit discount parameters and measures of time inconsistency in a risky environment
may therefore benefit from offering insurance payments similar to the safe income
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treatment in this experiment.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 3.2 discusses the related literature,
Section 3.3 describes the experiment, Section 3.4 provides an overview of the data
obtained in the experiment, Section 3.5 provides a theoretical discussion of the effects
of the treatments on the elicited discount factor and Section 3.6 gives the results
of the experiment. Section 3.7 studies how correlations between elicited time pref-
erences and financial outcome variables of interest are affected by income risk and
Section 3.8 concludes.
3.2 Related Literature
This paper contributes to two separate literatures. The first is the literature on
time inconsistencies in developing countries and its implications for policy. One of
the first papers in this literature was Ashraf et al. (2006) who show that take up
of commitment savings products is higher amongst present-biased individuals. In a
recent contribution, Bauer et al. (2011) show that strongly hyperbolic women are
likely to save less and borrow more than their time consistent counterparts. Duflo
et al. (2008) and Duflo et al. (2009) link the underutilization of fertilizer by farmers in
Kenya to hyperbolic discounting and Blackburn et al. (2009) find use of mosquito bed
nets in Orissa (India) consistent with hyperbolic discounting. This paper contributes
to this literature by providing evidence on the linkages between repayment data and
discounting behaviour and by explicitly considering future-biased preferences as well
as present-biased preferences.
The second literature this paper contributes to is the more technical, rapidly
growing literature on the estimation of time preferences and time-inconsistencies in
particular. In a seminal contribution Andersen et al. (2008) demonstrate that jointly
eliciting and estimating risk and time preferences significantly reduces the estimated
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discount factor. Similarly Andreoni and Sprenger (2010) show that offering convex
budget sets considerably changes the estimated time preferences due to the concave
nature of the utility function. This paper builds on these observations by considering
the effects of financial uncertainty and a concave utility function.
There have been several theories that have listed uncertainty as an explanation
for observed time inconsistencies. Dasgupta and Maskin (2005) for example, show
that hyperbolic discounting and time inconsistency can be explained by uncertainty
about when payoffs are realized.
A more basic example of uncertainty resulting in time inconsistencies is that of
‘researcher risk’: money that is offered today is guaranteed, any money that is just
promised in the future is less certain and may therefore be discounted more heavily.
This bias, however, only goes in one direction, making people appear present-biased.
It cannot explain the phenomenon of future-bias.
Very closely related to this study is also the experiment by Ferna´ndez-Villaverde
and Mukherji (2002) who test for hyperbolic discounting allowing for the presence
of random utility shocks. They design an experiment which asks undergraduate
students to choose when to play a computer game for a certain amount of time and
they allow for the fact that there is some uncertainty about how much utility the
participants may derive at a given point in time from playing this computer game.
Again the form of uncertainty studied here is of a very different nature and of a form
that applies to monetary as well as non-monetary stakes.
Also related is Takeuch (2011) who finds evidence that people tend to be future-
biased over short horizons and present-biased over longer horizons. This study is
consistent with this hypothesis as the time horizon is extremely short and there is
also a higher incidence of future-bias than present-bias. Varying degrees of uncer-
tainty in the long and short run could potentially explain why subjects reverse their
preferences for different horizons.
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3.3 The Experimental Setting and Description of the
Experiment
The experiment took place in a rural part of Hooghly, West Bengal, which is roughly
80 kilometres from Kolkata. The exact location is shown in Figure 3.1. The partic-
ipants were female microfinance clients and SHG members from a local NGO called
Mandra Unnayan Samsad. The majority of the participants were agricultural day
labourers with no safe income. The average weekly income was Rs. 280 or roughly
£3.50 and many participants were considered to be ‘ultra poor’ with hardly any
financial income at all.
The average weekly standard deviation in income of the participants was equal
to roughly Rs. 160. This number was derived by individually eliciting the belief of
the future income distribution of every participant (see Delavande et al. (2011) for
methodological details). The standard deviation of experimental income is higher
with Rs. 400; however, it is of the same order of magnitude.
Participants who took part in the experiment had to attended three experimental
sessions over the course of three weeks. In the first session, a group was welcomed
and it was explained that each participant was to be allocated into one of three
different treatment groups. This allocation was done publicly and at the individual
level. Out of a large bag participants were asked to draw a folded piece of paper each,
which allocated them into one of the three treatment groups. The participant kept
this piece of paper throughout the three weeks to remind them which treatment they
had been allocated to. These pieces of paper, shown in the appendix, both visually
and numerically explained the various treatments.
Treatment 1 (Risk free treatment). Participants receive a risk free payment of Rs.
200 in each of the three session.
Treatment 2 (With income risk in the future). Participants receive a risk free pay-
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Figure 3.1: The geographic location of the NGO
c© Google
ment of Rs. 200 in the first session. In the remaining two sessions, the participant
is exposed to experimentally generated income risk by playing a lottery that pays Rs.
800 with probability 0.25 and nothing with probability 0.75.
Treatment 3 (With income risk in all periods). Participants face experimentally
generated income risk in all three sessions by playing a lottery that pays Rs. 800
with probability 0.25 and nothing with probability 0.75.
Treatment 1 was designed to most closely resemble a risk-free environment. Un-
fortunately, the experiment is unable to generate a completely risk free environment,
since the experiment itself is embedded in the real world and participants’ real-world
income is subject to significant risk. Treatment 1 should therefore be seen only as
a relative benchmark to which the risk treatments (Treatments 2 and 3) can be
compared.
Treatment 2 was designed in order to understand whether experimentally induced
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future income risk can affect the estimates of discounting parameters. The lottery
was implemented by putting three red balls and one green ball into a bag and asking
the participant to draw one ball without looking. A green ball meant the participant
won Rs. 800 and a red ball meant the participant won nothing.
Treatment 3 consisted of the same lottery in every single meeting, including the
first meeting. The aim of this treatment was to test the hypothesis that the current
income realization will affect the choices in the multiple price list.
All treatments are summarized in Figure 3.2.
Figure 3.2: The Three Treatments
Treatment 1
+ Rs. 200 + Rs. 200 + Rs. 200
t = 0 t = 1 t = 2
Treatment 2
+ Rs. 200
risk and time mpl
lottery 800/0/0/0 lottery 800/0/0/0
t = 0 t = 1 t = 2
Treatment 3
lottery 800/0/0/0 lottery 800/0/0/0 lottery 800/0/0/0
t = 0 t = 1 t = 2
Once the participants had been allocated to their treatment groups, they were
asked to leave the room and come back in one by one. They were then individu-
ally helped by a field assistant to fill out survey forms and the multiple price lists,
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designed to elicit time preferences. 1
Multiple price lists are among the most common methods of eliciting time pref-
erences. A multiple price list offers the choice between a fixed amount of money in
one period and varying amounts of money in a later period. Here the choice was
between Rs. 200 at the earlier date and varying amounts of money at the later
date. The value of the deferred payment monotonically decreases from Rs 250 all
the way to Rs. 150, thus offering decreasing returns to delaying the payment. For
each row the participant had to choose either the sooner or the later payment and
was told that one of their choices would randomly be selected and paid out. This
randomization was done using a bag of ping pong balls numbered for each row.
The point at which the subject switches from preferring the, usually larger, later
payment to the smaller, sooner payment can then be used to derive bounds on
the discount factor. In the limit as the intervals between choices become arbitrarily
small, the switching point denotes complete indifference between the two options. In
practice, the interval midpoint is often used to find a point estimate for the discount
factor.
Each participant was asked to fill out two such multiple price lists as shown
in Figure 3.3. The first one offered the choice between Rs. 200 immediately and
varying amounts of money next week, and the second one offered the choice between
Rs. 200 next week and varying amounts the week after next week.
A time consistent participant is one who switches at the same point in both
multiple price lists. That is, one is time consistent when one is neither more patient in
the future or in the presence, but has the same level of patience (and hence discount
factor) in all periods. Participants who switched sooner in the first multiple price
1This had to be done individually as participants were mostly illiterate and when, during pi-
lot sessions, they were asked to respond to questions in the presence of other group members, it
was impossible to completely stop others from interfering, giving advice or simply distracting the
participant.
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list than in the second multiple price list are classified as present-biased and those
who switched later in the first price list than in the second are classified as future-
biased. Participants who switched multiple times (about 10%) were excluded from
the analysis as they most likely had difficulty in understanding the instructions. The
number of participants with multiple switches does not vary systematically across
treatments.
Before answering any questions about time preferences though, all participants
received the first payment which varied according to which treatment they had been
allocated to earlier. Participants in either treatment 1 or 2 received Rs. 200 imme-
diately and participants in treatment 3 first played the lottery and either received
nothing or Rs. 800 before being asked any questions. Once this money was handed
out, the participant was asked to fill in a multiple price list in order to elicit their
discount factors.
Figure 3.3: Participants were asked to fill out two multiple price lists. One for
the immediate and one for the future discount factor. The final column in each
table denotes the interval of the discount parameter if the participant switches from
preferring the delayed payment to the sooner payment in that row.
Multiple Price List 1
Naive
Today In 1 Week β ∗ δ interval
1. Rs 200 vs. Rs 250 (0, 0.8)
2. Rs 200 vs. Rs 220 (0.8, 0.91)
3. Rs 200 vs. Rs 210 (0.91, 0.95)
4. Rs 200 vs. Rs 200 (0.95, 1)
5. Rs 200 vs. Rs 190 (1, 1.05)
6. Rs 200 vs. Rs 180 (1.05, 1.11)
7. Rs 200 vs. Rs 150 (1.11, 1.33)
Multiple Price List 2
Naive
In 1 Week In 2 Weeks δ interval
1. Rs 200 vs. Rs 250 (0, 0.8)
2. Rs 200 vs. Rs 220 (0.8, 0.91)
3. Rs 200 vs. Rs 210 (0.91, 0.95)
4. Rs 200 vs. Rs 200 (0.95, 1)
5 . Rs 200 vs. Rs 190 (1, 1.05)
6. Rs 200 vs. Rs 180 (1.05, 1.11)
7. Rs 200 vs. Rs 150 (1.11, 1.33)
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After the discounting exercise, the individuals were asked to choose one of 6
lotteries in order to elicit their degree of risk-aversion. The elicited CRRA coeffi-
cients can then be used to control for the curvature of the utility function. The
approach used for eliciting risk aversion followed closely the original Binswanger
(1980) methodology of eliciting risk preferences in developing countries. The par-
ticipant is offered a choice between lotteries which increase monotonically both in
expected return but also in variance. Once a participant has chosen her preferred
lottery, bounds on her CRRA coefficient can be determined the same way the time
multiple price list is used to determine bounds on the discount factor.
Finally, participants were asked to answer a few simple IQ questions. The test
used was a culture fair IQ test originally developed by Cattell (1949) and Cattell
(1960). This particular test was written by Weiss (2006). A sample question is given
in the appendix. This test was administered in light of prior evidence that cognitive
ability correlates with economic preference parameters Dohmen et al. (2010).
3.4 The Data
A total of 134 women took part in the experiment. 45 were allocated to treatment
1, 46 to treatment 2 and 43 to treatment 3. Since treatment 3 involves a lottery
before the decisions in the discounting game are taken, there are effectively two sub
treatments in treatment 3: treatment 3(a) for participants who won nothing before
answering the discounting questions and treatment 3(b) for participants who won
Rs. 800 before answering the discounting games.
Overall about 60% of the sample exhibited time consistent preferences, 30% were
future-biased and the remaining 10% were present-biased. How this differs across
treatments will be analysed in more detail in Section (3.6).
Surprisingly, about a third of respondents weakly preferred a smaller amount
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Figure 3.4: Distribution of the biases
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further in the future to a sooner, larger amount. That is, they appear to have a
discount factor greater than 1. This phenomenon is even stronger when comparing
payments in the current period to payments in the future, where 45% of participants
at least weakly prefer a smaller payment in the future to a larger immediate payment.
Figure 3.5: For a large fraction of the participants the discount factor exceeds 1
(a) Future Discount Factor
Delta < 1
Delta > 1
0
20
40
60
80
Pe
rc
en
t
(b) Immediate Discount Factor
Beta*Delta < 1
Beta* Delta > 1
0
20
40
60
80
Pe
rc
en
t
CHAPTER 3. RISK AND TIME INCONSISTENCY 54
To check that observable characteristics are balanced across treatments, I regress
each treatment condition on a range of individual level characteristics and use an
F-test to test the balance across treatments. The results are presented in Table 3.1
and for all treatment conditions the F-test fails to reject that all covariates enter
with a zero coefficient at conventional levels.
In addition, most coefficients are individually not significantly different from zero
with the exception of ’age’. However, the difference, although significantly different
from zero, is extremely small. In addition, all results in this study are fully robust
to the inclusion of all these individual level characteristics as is demonstrated in the
appendix.
Table 3.1: Testing the balance across treatments
(1) (2) (3)
Treatment 1 Treatment 2 Treatment 3
Age 0.00 0.01* -0.01**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
IQ -0.04 0.03 0.00
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Education 0.01 -0.02 0.01
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
literate -0.02 0.17 -0.16
(0.21) (0.21) (0.21)
CRRA -0.00 0.02 -0.02
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Income -0.00 0.00 -0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Hindu -0.28 0.22 0.06
(0.18) (0.18) (0.18)
Observations 128 128 128
F-test 0.874 1.342 0.890
Prob > F 0.529 0.236 0.516
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
CHAPTER 3. RISK AND TIME INCONSISTENCY 55
3.5 Theoretical Discussion
Before turning to the results of the experiment, this section analyses the theoretical
predictions of income risk on the estimated discount factor.
Two separate models of choice under uncertainty are examined. First, the pre-
dictions under classical expected utility theory (EUT) are derived. Then, predictions
under reference dependent utility are contrasted to these predictions. In recent years
a whole host of reference dependent utility models has been developed, but the most
natural choice given the set up of the experiment is the one of Ko˝szegi and Rabin
(2007) who model the reference point as a stochastic belief of future expectations.
Once participants have been allocated into their respective treatment groups,
they hold a piece of paper to remind them how much money to expect in the future
and with what probability. For most participants a significant amount of time elapses
between allocation to a treatment group and making the choices in the experiment,
thereby allowing expectations enough time to form.
3.5.1 Classical Expected Utility Theory
Assume that expected utility theory holds and agents have instantaneous utility over
consumption c given by u(c; θ) with uθ > 0, uθθ < 0 and uθθθ > 0, where θ measures
concavity of the utility function. The condition on the third derivative corresponds to
assuming the utility function satisfies prudence which implies precautionary savings.
This assumption is implied by standard utility functions which satisfy DARA and/or
CRRA such as the isoelastic utility function.2
Assume further that agents are (potentially) quasi-hyperbolic discounters who
in addition to the classical exponential discount factor δ discount all future periods
relative to the current period with an additional β. Hence the immediate discount
2It will be made explicit later on where this condition matters and what happens if it is not
satisfied
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factor between the current period and the future is given by βδ and the future
discount factor between two periods in the future is given by δ.
Due to the randomization in the experiment, there is no reason to expect the
discount factors of participants to differ systematically across treatments, since al-
location to treatment groups is random.
On the contrary, the estimated discount factor may differ. As was outlined in
section 3.3, researchers often deduce the discount factor based on the number of
patient choices made in the multiple price list. This section is going to show that
participants who make identical choices in the multiple price list, but are in different
treatments, do not necessarily have the same discount factor. Estimated parameters
will be denoted with a hat, such as β̂δ in order to differentiate them from the true
βδ according to which participants make their choices in the multiple price lists.
For the sake of simplicity, we assume here that discount parameters are estimated
as outlined previously: a linear utility function is assumed and the estimates of the
discount factors can then be directly calculated without a need of complex estimation
techniques.
Finally, assume that agents cannot save between periods. While this assumption
may seem extreme, it is not completely inaccurate for the typical rural Indian woman
who took part in this experiment. In fact, 99% of participants (all but one) said they
are not happy with the way in which they can save money and would like access to
a better savings technology. 62% do not have a savings account and most of those
who do have one, have to share it with their husband.3
3In addition, a model that allows for perfect saving, the payments in the experiment would be
negligible compared to the life time income of the participants. As such, we should expect to see
near perfect risk-neutrality and discount factors of 1 only (Heinemann (2008)). Since this is clearly
not the case, some assumptions need to be relaxed.
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The Immediate Discount Factor
The immediate discount factor is defined as the discount factor between the current
period and the future. In classical economic theory this should be identical to the
long run discount factor, but if agents are time-inconsistent the two may be different.
A participant in treatment 1, who accepts the immediate payment of Rs 200, will
have utility of u(y + 200) + βδ1u(y), where y = 200 is her safe, per period income.
4
The utility from accepting the delayed payment of Rs. m, on the contrary, will be
u(y) + βδ1u(y +m).
Assuming that at the switching point the participant is roughly indifferent be-
tween these two options, we can implicitly derive the value of βδ1 for participants
in treatment 1:5
u(y + 200) + βδ1u(y) = u(y) + βδ1u(y +m) (3.1)
This expression can straightforwardly be rearranged to give an explicit value of βδ :
βδ1 =
u(y + 200) − u(y)
u(y +m)− u(y) (3.2)
Now consider a participant in treatment 2 who switches at the same point in the
multiple price list and hence is also indifferent between Rs. 200 now and Rs. m in
the future. Her immediate discount factor is implicitly defined by:
u(400) + βδ2E(u(y)) = u(200) + βδ2E(u(y +m)). (3.3)
4Note, that the analysis here abstracts from background income and the associate risk in income.
The reason for doing so is that it will be the same across treatments.
5To derive the theoretical predictions, I am going to treat the switching point in the multiple
price list as denoting indifference between the two options. Of course in reality the intervals are
relatively large so that these are only the lower bounds on the discount factor rather than point
estimates. However, instead of referring everywhere to the ’lower bound on the discount factor’, I
am simply going to refer to ’the discount factor’ for ease of comprehension.
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Where E(y) = y = 200 since y is equal to 800 with probability 0.25 and zero
with probability 0.75. This can again be simply rearranged for βδ:
βδ2 =
u(400) − u(200)
Ey
(
u(y +m)− u(y)) (3.4)
Comparing (3.2) and (3.4) directly shows that two participants making identical
choices in the multiple price list do not have the same discount factor if they are in
different treatments. In particular, it is the case that the participant in treatment 2
is not as patient as her counterpart in treatment 1 (has a lower βδ), although they
made the same choices in the price lists.
Proposition 7. Given the same discount factor βδ a participant in Treatment 1
(without income risk) will switch for a lower m than a participant in Treatment 2
(with income risk).
Proof. u′(y +m)− u′(y) < 0 by u′′ > 0. u′′(y +m) − u′′(y) > 0 by u′′′ > 0. Hence
u(y+m)−u(y) is convex. Applying Jensen’s inequality then directly gives βδ1 > βδ2.
Hence for a given switching point m, participants in Treatment 1 are more patient
than participants in Treatment 2, βδ1 > βδ2.
A researcher who is not aware of the differential background risk, however, would
naively conclude that anyone switching at the same point in the multiple price list
has the same discount factor.
Assuming that βδ is identically distributed across treatment groups, we hence
expect the distribution of switching points to differ across treatments and in partic-
ular, we expect the participants in treatment 2 to make more patient choices. Hence
the following hypothesis follows.6
Hypothesis 1. Participants in treatment 2, who are exposed to income risk, will
make more patient decisions in the multiple price list than participants in treatment
6Clearly, the opposite would hold for u′′′ < 0.
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1, who are not exposed to income risk. The naively estimated immediate discount
factor β̂δ therefore overestimates the true immediate discount factor.
Next, we turn to participants in Treatment 3 who either won Rs. 800 or noth-
ing before answering the multiple price list. A participant from Treatment 3 who
switches between receiving Rs. 200 immediately or Rs. m next week has a discount
factor βδ implicitly defined by
u(y1 + 200) + βδ3E(u(y)) = u(y1) + βδ2E(u(y +m)). (3.5)
where y1 is either equal to 800 or 0 depending on the outcome of the lottery.
βδ3 =
u(y1 + 200) − u(y1)
E
(
u(y +m)− u(y)) (3.6)
Clearly the difference to Treatments 1 and 2 now depends on the realization of the
lottery.
Hypothesis 2. Participants who received a large payment (y1 = 800) in treatment
3 make more patient choices in the multiple price list than participants in treatments
1 and 2 who receive a smaller payment (y1 = 200). The naively estimated immediate
discount factor β̂δ3 therefore overestimates the true discount factor βδ3
Proof. As for Hypothesis 1, we first establish that for a given βδ the optimal switch-
ing point in treatment 2 is higher than in treatment 3 by directly comparing 3.6 to
3.4. The above hypothesis follows again by assuming that the underlying distribution
of true βδ is the same across treatment groups.
This is a very intuitive result, stating that those participants who had a very
high current income realisation will appear more patient in the short run than their
counterparts who have received nothing at all or much less. Again, a researcher who
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does not know about the current income realization would deduce a wrong discount
factor based on the choices in the multiple price list.
Hypothesis 3. Participants who receive no payment (y1 = 0) in treatment 3 will
make fewer patient choices in the multiple price list than participants in treatments
2 and 3(b) who receive a payment (y1 = 200 and y1 = 800 respectively). The naively
estimated immediate discount factor β̂δ3 therefore underestimates the true immediate
discount factor βδ3
Proof. As above and comparing equations 3.2 to 3.6 and 3.4 to 3.6.
Again this is a very intuitive result stating that those participants who received
nothing in the current period will appear more impatient than those who received
something (either Rs. 200 or Rs. 800) in an otherwise identical environment.
The Future Discount Factor
The future discount factor, in contrast, is determined by the trade-off the participant
makes between receiving payments in one week or in two weeks. The future discount
factor is determined in exactly the same way as the immediate discount factor, by
equating utility from the sooner and later options and solving for δ:
u(y + 200) + δ1u(y) = u(y) + δ1u(y +m) (3.7)
⇒ δ1 = u(y + 200) − u(y)
u(y +m)− u(y) . (3.8)
For participants in treatment 2, on the contrary, we have the following condition:
Eyu(y + 200) + δ2Eyu(y) = Eyu(y) + δ2Eyu(y +m) (3.9)
⇒ δ2 = Eyu(y + 200) − Eyu(y)
Eyu(y +m)− Eyu(y) . (3.10)
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Applying Jensen’s inequality twice, it is clear that the numerator as well as the
denominator of δ2 are greater than the numerator and denominator of δ1. Due to
u′′′ > 0 and hence u(y +m) − u(y) being convex, the increase in the denominator
is larger (smaller) than the increase in the numerator when m > 200 (m < 200).
While it is analytically non-trivial to show this, the increase in the increase in the
larger of the two, numerator and denominator, is always larger than the increase in
the smaller of the two as is shown in Figure 3.7 and 3.6.7
Figure 3.6: Future discount factors in
treatments 1 and 2 as a function of the
switching point, assuming CRRA utility
function with γ = 0.5 and risk as in ex-
periment.
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Figure 3.6 plots, for a given CRRA coefficient of γ = 0.5, the relationship between
discount factor and switching point. For example, participants with δ = 1.2 would
prefer Rs. 200 next week to Rs. 150 in two weeks if they were allocated to treatment
1. On the contrary, if they were allocated to treatment 2 they would prefer Rs. 150
in two weeks time to Rs. 200 in one week. Hence a participant in treatment 1 is
more patient than a participant in treatment 2 with the same switching point.
7This holds for all DARA utility functions (which is implied by our assumption of u′′′ > 0). The
result is reversed for IARA utility functions. For CARA utility functions the two functions coincide.
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For m > 200 the opposite holds however: a participant who switches at m > 200
is more patient if he is in treatment 2 than if he were in treatment 1. Participants
who have a discount factor such that it falls between the two thresholds for δ1 and
δ2 would therefore choose different switching points in different treatments. If they
were allocated to treatment 1, they would prefer the later option and if they were
allocated to treatment 2 they would prefer the sooner option.
Figure 3.7 shows that this is not only the case for the special case of γ = 0.5, but
that this holds for the entire parameter space of a CRRA utility function. Figure
3.7 plots the discount factors given a fixed switching point m > 200 but for varying
degrees of γ. The difference in discount factor, given the same switching point, is
therefore clearly increasing in the degree of risk aversion of the participant. 8
Treatment 2 and treatment 3 only differ in the first period, so under the assump-
tion of no savings between periods the predictions for treatments 3 and 2 should be
identical. It is discussed below how these predictions would differ if we were to relax
the assumption of no savings.
Hypothesis 4. The naively estimated future discount factor δˆ is higher (lower) in
Treatment 2 and 3 than that in Treatment 1 for m > 200 (m < 200). In other
words, income risk introduces a bias away from 1.
Proof. see Figure 3.6
Participants in treatment 3 either received a very large payment or nothing at
all in the first period while participants in treatment 2 all received a payment of
medium size. If either money can be saved directly or if there is some means of
transferring utility over time, we would expect this to have an effect in the decision
in the multiple price lists.
8The mean CRRA coefficient in my sample 1.7 and the median is 0.9.
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Participants who have received the large positive income shock for example,
would be more likely to appear patient as their immediate budget constraint has
been relaxed. Similarly participants who receive nothing at all could appear less
patient than their counterparts in treatment 2 who received some income at least.
This section derived the predictions of EUT for what effects we should expect
the experimental treatments to have. It has demonstrated that without resorting
to behavioural assumptions it is possible to generate different discount factors for
the present and the future. Lack of access to a savings technology combined with
income risk are sufficient to create this effect. This is not to say that there is no
underlying behavioural bias present, but in addition to any existing temptation the
participant may have, lack of savings in an uncertain environment can theoretically
give rise to time inconsistent choices in the lab.
3.5.2 Reference Point Dependent Utility
The previous section outlined a model of EUT and derived the effects of uncertainty
on the estimated discount factor. In contrast, this section analyses what predictions
can be made if agents are not EU maximizers, but instead are loss averse relative to
their expectations. The model of expectations as reference points used here directly
follows Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2007)
Instead of evaluating the outcome relative to a fixed reference point, Ko˝szegi and
Rabin (2007) allow the reference point itself to be stochastic. For example, consider
someone who does not expect to take part in a gamble in which he gains $1 if a
coin comes up heads and in which he loses $1 if it comes up tails. He will, with
equal probability, have $1 more than expected and 1 less than expected. That is, he
experiences a gain with probability 0.5 and a loss with probability 0.5. In this case
the model coincides with the standard model in which the reference point represents
the status quo.
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However now suppose the agent already expected to take part in this gamble.
His reference point in that case is that he wins one dollar with probability 0.5 and
that he loses one dollar with probability 0.5. His expected utility of taking part in
the gamble is hence evaluated as follows: With probability 0.5 he will neither gain
or lose anything because he had the right expectation. With probability 0.25 on the
other hand he will have expected to win $ 1 and he loses $ 1, which is an overall
loss of 2 dollars. Similarly with probability 0.25 he expected to lose, yet he won and
thus he has a relative gain of 2 dollars. An expected gamble therefore evokes two
separate feelings: one of loss when a win was expected and one of a gain when a loss
was expected.
Formally, let utility from wealth w be u(w|r) = m(w) + µ(m(w) −m(r)) where
r is the reference point and µ is the gain loss utility relative to the reference point.
m(w) is the classical outcome utility and for the purposes of this paper we also
follow Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2007) in assuming that m() is linear. The model requires
several standard assumptions on the gain-loss utility µ() :
Assumption 1.
1. µ is continuous for all x and twice differentiable.
2. µ is strictly increasing.
3. If y > x ≥ 0 then µ(y) + µ(−y) < µ(x) + µ(−x).
4. µ′′ < 0 for x > 0 and µ′′ ≥ 0 for x < 0.
5. If x > 0 limx→0(µ′+x/µ
′
−x) ≡ λ > 1
These assumptions are mainly due to the original Kahneman and Tversky (1979)
article and were first formalized by Bowman et al. (1999). For the limited purposes
of this paper we are going to use a specific functional form for µ given by
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µ(x|r) =


(x− r)α if (x− r) ≥ 0
−λ(r − x)α if (x− r) < 0
with λ > 1.
The expected utility from a gamble is then derived as follows: if a random
variable x is drawn from a distribution F and the reference lottery is a probability
measure G, the expected utility of x, given the reference lottery, is given by:
u(F |G) =
∫ ∫
u(w|r)dG(r)dF (w). (3.11)
This captures the notion that every outcome is evaluated relative to all possible
outcomes in the reference lottery. The expected utility is simply the weighted utility
of all possible states.
For the three treatments we have three different reference lotteries:
1. Treatment 1: the expectation is to receive Rs. 200 in each meeting.
2. Treatment 2: the expectation is to receive Rs. 200 in the first meeting and to
play the lottery (800, 0.25; 0, 0.75) in the following two meetings.
3. Treatment 3: the expectation is to play the lottery (800, 0.25; 0, 0.75) in all
three meetings.
The multiple price list, which offers payments either right away, in one weeks
time or in two weeks time, is then presented to the participant. Any money she
earns through the price list is unexpected and therefore not part of her reference
lottery. The participant’s choice is then to decide when she would like to receive
this ‘extra’ income.
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The Immediate Discount Factor
In the first multiple price list the participant chooses between either surprising her-
self with Rs. 200 today or with a future Rs. m next week. For those in treat-
ment 1, utility from accepting the Rs. 200 right away is given by u(400|r =
200) + βδ1u(200|r = 200) and utility from accepting Rs. m next period is given
by u(200|r = 200) + βδ1u(200 +m|r = 200). Again assuming that at the switching
point the participant is roughly indifferent between the two options we can find a
value for βδ1:
βδ1 =
u(400|r = 200) − u(200|r = 200)
u(200 +m|r = 200) − u(200|r = 200) (3.12)
In treatment 2, if the participant chooses the current payment of Rs. 200, she
will face next week’s lottery without any additional income. In this case she will
receive overall Rs. 400 this week, Rs. 200 more than expected given the treatment
allocation, and the expected utility of the lottery on its own next week:
u(400|r = 200) + βδ2Eu(lottery|r = lottery) (3.13)
Her expected utility from the lottery on it’s own, Eu(lottery|r = lottery), is
given by 200 + 3/16µ(800) + 3/16µ(−800). That is, the expected utility consists of
the expected value of the lottery plus utility and disutility due to being positively
or negatively surprised by the lottery outcome. Since λ > 1 the loss of not receiving
Rs. 800 weighs more than the gain of receiving Rs. 800 and hence the agent would
prefer the Rs. 200 certainty equivalent of the lottery.
If instead the participant chooses to receive Rs. m next period she will receive
Rs. 200 this week as expected, but next week she will receive an unexpected Rs. m
as well as face the lottery.
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Figure 3.8: The immediate discount factors as a function of the concavity/convexity
of the loss and gains function for m = 210 and λ = 2
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u(200|r = 200) + βδ2Eu(m+ lottery|r = lottery) (3.14)
Assuming once again that the participant is indifferent at the switching point,
we can solve for βδ2:
βδ2 =
u(400|r = 200) − u(200|r = 200)
Eu(m+ lottery|r = lottery)− Eu(lottery|r = lottery) (3.15)
These two values of βδ1 and βδ2 are plotted in Figures 3.8, 3.9 and 3.10. In
Figure 3.8 it can be clearly seen that for sufficiently high levels of concavity of the
gains function and respective convexity of the loss function, that is for α sufficiently
smaller than 1, we have βδ2 > βδ1 with the opposite being the case if agents are risk
loving in gains and risk averse in losses (α > 1).
The intuition behind this result is relatively straight forward: because the utility
function is concave in gains, the relative increase in utility from receiving Rs. 800
to receiving Rs 800 +m is less than the increase from 0 to m. Similarly, convexity
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Figure 3.9: The immediate discount factors as a function of the degree of loss aversion
λ for α = 0.75 and m = 210
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Figure 3.10: The immediate discount factors as a function of the switching point m
for α = 0.75 and λ = 2
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in losses implies that the gain from reducing a loss of 800 to a loss of Rs. 800 −m
is not as great as the benefit of receiving Rs. m instead of zero. This implies that a
participant in treatment 2 has to be more patient than a participant in treatment 1
in order to have the same switching point.
However, there is also a counterbalancing effect at play as can be seen in Figure
3.9. Since λ > 1, losses weigh more heavily than gains. Hence for sufficiently
large values of λ, the gain from reducing losses outweighs the loss of utility due
to concavity/convexity of the utility function. For the special case of a piece-wise
linear utility function with a kink at the reference point for example, this second
effect outweighs the prior and βδ2 < βδ1.
Hence to conclude, this model of loss aversion cannot predict in which direction
uncertainty will affect the estimation of the immediate discount factor. Calibration
with ‘standard’ parameter values suggests that we should observe lower naive dis-
count factors in the risk treatment as seen in Figure 3.10. However, the amount of
estimates available for these parameters in similar settings is very limited and it is
therefore difficult to judge what reasonable estimates for these parameters should
be.
The Future Discount Factor
To derive estimates of the future discount factor, the participant has to choose
between two periods in both of which he either faces no income risk (treatment 1)
or in both of which he faces the same amount of income risk (treatment 2 and 3).
In treatment 1, the estimates are therefore straightforwardly the same as for the
immediate discount factors.
δ1 =
u(400|r = 200) − u(200|r = 200)
u(200 +m|r = 200) − u(200|r = 200) (3.16)
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Figure 3.11: The future discount factor with α = 0.5, λ = 2 as a function of the
switching point
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For participants in treatments 2 and 3 however, the estimates are now given by:
βδ2 =
Eu(200 + lottery|r = lottery)− Eu(lottery|r = lottery)
Eu(m+ lottery|r = lottery)− Eu(lottery|r = lottery) . (3.17)
In both periods the agent faces a lottery and therefore can only choose in which
period she would like to have a safe payment in addition to the lottery. The two
discount factors are plotted in Figures 3.11, 3.12 and 3.13. Since the participant now
faces the same potential loss in each period, there is no longer a benefit to delaying
consumption in order to offset potential losses. Hence, the two discount factors can
now be unambiguously signed. For m > 200 we have δ2 < δ1 and vice versa for
m < 200 as is depicted in 3.11.
Hypothesis 5. The naively estimated future discount factor δˆ in treatment 2 and 3
is higher (lower) than that in treatment 1 for m > 200 (m < 200).
As can be seen by comparing Figure 3.11 and Figure 3.6, uncertainty has exactly
the opposite effect in the reference point model and in the EUT model. The fact
that both theories give directly opposite predictions allows us to test easily which
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Figure 3.12: The future discount factor with γ = 0.75,m = 210 as a function of the
degree of loss aversion
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Figure 3.13: The future discount factor with m = 210, λ = 2 as a function of the
convexity/concavity
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theory finds more support in the data.
Figure 3.12 shows that this results holds for all values of λ, holding fixed m. Not
receiving anything is costly because it represents a loss relative to the expectation of
winning the lottery. Agents prefer to minimize this loss by receiving additional, safe
income. The participant in the risky treatment therefore has an additional reason to
prefer the higher payment relative to the participant in the safe treatment. Hence,
a participant in the risky treatment who switches at the same point as someone in
the safe treatment is, in fact, less patient.
3.6 Results
This section will present results on how the decisions in the multiple price lists were
affected by the various treatments and hence by income risk. For each multiple
price list the relevant information is how many patient choices a participant makes
before switching to the earlier payment. Under the null hypothesis that income
risk has no effect on decision making in the price lists, the choices should not differ
systematically across treatments.
To understand if these switching points systematically vary across treatments, I
test the hypothesis that the switching points in all three treatments, and therefore
the parameters a researcher would estimate using these switching points, come from
the same distribution. This is first done using the Kruskal Wallis equality of rank test
and then the treatments are compared pairwise using the Whitney-Mann-Wilcoxon
rank sum test.
These non-parametric hypothesis tests are preferred to a standard t-test in this
setting for two reasons: Firstly the intervals in the multiple price list are somewhat
arbitrary. Point estimates of discount factors are therefore necessarily very sensitive
to the exact interval chosen and hence any comparison of these point estimates is
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equally dependent on the chosen intervals. Instead, the nature of the data should
be interpreted as ordinal and the question of interest is whether or not uncertainty
can cause participants to make more or fewer patient choices. For this a rank sum
test is the most natural choice.
The second reason for choosing the rank sum test is that it does not rely on the
assumption of a normal distribution. In light of both the nature of the data and the
small sample size, this is another reason to prefer the non-parametric tests.
3.6.1 The Effects of Uncertainty on the Immediate Discount Factor
βδ
In order to understand how the treatments have affected participants’ choices in the
first multiple price list, I compare the distribution of choices across all treatments.
These distributions are graphically represented in Figure 3.14 for each treatment
group. To put this in perspective, a participant with 3 patient choices has an es-
timated discount factor just under 1 (β̂δ ∈ [0.95, 1]) and a participant making 4
patient choices has a estimated discount factor just above 1 ( β̂δ ∈ [1, 1.05]). Hence,
it is not surprising to see that over an interval of one week most participants make 3
or 4 patient choices in all three treatments. There are also clearly a few differences
in the distributions such as fewer participants switching after 3 patient choices in
treatments 2 and 3 relative to 1. However, to test if these are significant differences
the Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test is used.
After correcting for ties (since more than one participant has a switching point of
3, for example) the Kruskal-Wallis test fails to reject the null hypothesis of equal dis-
tribution with χ2 = 2.42 and p = 0.49. Similarly Whitney-Mann-Wilcoxon pairwise
tests cannot reject that when any two treatments are compared pairwise that they
come from the same distribution. Mean switching points (reported in the appendix)
do not differ significantly across treatments either.
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Figure 3.14: The distribution of switching points in the first multiple price list,
eliciting immediate discount factors, reported individually by treatment.
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Taken together, this suggests that uncertainty had no noticeable effect on the
choices made in the price list. While this contradicts the simple EUT model derived
in the theory section, it does not reject nor confirm the reference point theory.
It is also worth noting that this finding is also in line with a model in which the
experimental payments (and therefore also experiment risks) are absorbed by the
background income of the participant. However, such a model would also predict
that participants should behave as being approximately risk neutral and extremely
patient as any gain from the experiment is negligible relative to life-time income
(Heinemann (2008)), neither of which is observed here.
3.6.2 The Effects of Uncertainty on the Future Discount Factor δ
To understand how choices between payments in the future are affected by risk, this
subsection compares the choices in the second multiple price list by treatment.
The distribution of choices are once again represented graphically in Figure 3.15.
It is interesting to note that the distributions in this figure look remarkably different
from the those of the immediate discount factor. For treatment 1 in particular, the
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Figure 3.15: The distribution of switching points in the second multiple price list,
eliciting future discount factors, reported individually by treatment
distributions should look identical if participants were all completely time consistent
(β = 1). In the remaining treatments uncertainty in itself could potentially have
induced otherwise time consistent participants to appear time-inconsistent, but for
treatment 1 the fact that the distributions look very different can be considered
evidence of pure time-inconsistent preferences.
The Kruskal-Wallis test formally confirms that the observed samples in the 4
treatments do not come from the same population. With a χ2 = 9.768 and p = 0.020
we can reject the hypothesis that the distributions in all treatment groups come from
the same population.
Comparing them pairwise using the Withney-Mann-Wilcoxon rank sum test we
can reject that treatment 1 and treatment 2 come from the same population (p =
0.074) and that treatment 2 and 3 come from the same population (p = 0.05). That
treatment 1 and 3 come from the same distribution, however, cannot be rejected
(p = 0.76).
While the median for both treatment 1 and treatment 2 is 3 patient choices, the
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mean is higher in treatment 2 than in treatment 1 (2.5 patient choices in treatment
1 versus 3.4 in treatment 2, details are reported in the appendix). Participants in
the risky treatment therefore, on average, appear more patient than those in the
safe treatment.
Going back to the theory, the hypothesis gave different predictions depending
on whether δ > 1 or δ < 1. For δ < 1 the EUT model predicted that participants
would make fewer patient choices and for δ > 1 participants were expected to make
more patient choices. The reverse was the case for the reference point theory. Un-
fortunately the nature of the non-parametric test used here does not allow to test
for this differential impact directly.
The majority of the participants in treatments 2 and 3 has made choices such
that δ < 1 (52 to 23 respectively) which suggests that overall we can focus on the
predictions made for the case of δ < 1.
To further investigate this, the Kruskal-Wallis test on the subsample of those
participants with δ < 1 also rejects the hypothesis that the four treatments come
from the same distribution with p = 0.039. Again the Withney-Mann-Wilcoxon rank
sum rejects pairwise that treatments 1 and 2 and treatments 1 and 3 originate from
the same distribution. The median number of patient choices in the second MPL is
2 in treatment 1 and 3 in treatments 2 and 3. Hence participants, on average, make
more patient choices under risk than under certainty, thereby directly contradicting
the predictions made by EUT (or implying u′′′ < 0) and supporting those of the
reference point model.9
9Alternatively, using an OLS regression we can more directly control for the differential impact,
although at the expense of potentially erroneous standard errors. This alternative analysis comes
to the same conclusion and is reported in the appendix for completeness.
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3.6.3 The Effects of Uncertainty on the Bias
Since uncertainty has had differential effects on the immediate and on the future
discount factors, it can be expected that time inconsistency has been affected as
well.
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Figure 3.16: The biases by treatment
Figure 3.16 shows how the biases are distributed across treatments. β > 1 refers
to future-biased participants who make more patient choices now compared to in the
future, β = 1 refers to time consistent participants who are equally patient now and
in the future and β < 1 refers to present-biased participants who are more patient
in the future than now.
The Kruskal-Wallis test clearly rejects the hypothesis that all treatment groups
follow the same distribution with χ2 = 12.75 and p = 0.005.
In treatment 1, more participants are future-biased than present-biased and in
treatment 2 this inequality is reversed with more participants being present-biased
than future-biased. Formally, the Mann-Whitney-Wlicoxon test also rejects that
choices in treatment 1 and 2 originate from the same distribution (p = 0.013).
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Interestingly the distribution of biases between treatment groups 1 and 3 is once
again not significantly different (p = 0.72) while the difference between 2 and 3 once
again is significant according the Whitney-Mann-Wilcoxon test (p = 0.07). Since
the immediate discount factor is very similarly distributed across treatment groups,
the fact that the future discount factor seems to respond to uncertainty has led to an
increase in what appears to be present-biased preferences and reduced the incidence
of future-bias.
This finding is indicative of the fact that our estimates of time inconsistency are
very sensitive to the relative riskiness of the background environment in which they
are elicited. Considering that the amount of income risk induced by this experiment
is not out of line with what one may expect to find in developing countries, especially
across seasons, this result has direct relevance to researchers wishing to elicit time
preferences in the field.
3.7 Financial Market Outcomes
This section studies whether being present or future-biased has any effect on actual
financial decision making and if income risk can present an obstacle to identifying
these correlations. This section will also address in detail the question if income risk
affects the correlations between real world decision making and parameters elicited
in the experiment. If the correlations are robust to the income risk generated by the
experiment, then even if there is a significant effect on the estimated parameters,
income risk should not pose a major concern for most researchers who are only
interested in the implications of time inconsistency.
One outcome variable of interest here is the repayment rate for the participants
loans. The ideal repayment metric to look at would of course be the incidence of
default, but for many microfinance organizations default is not a very well defined
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concept. Often loan durations are simply extended until the final payment has been
made. Usually these delayed repayments are then associated with a fee or simply
higher interest payments. Mandra Unnayan Samsad, the NGO I was working with,
also has an extremely low fraction of defaults: in the entire sample of participants
only one had ever defaulted on a loan.
Another way of studying the repayment behaviour however, is to look at how
many of the scheduled payments have been missed. There is a considerable amount
of variation among the participants in my sample in how many late or missed re-
payments they have. Missing a repayment is not costless because the interest on the
full outstanding amount has to be paid at every monthly due date and the amount
of interest decreases with every repayment that has been made.
Before turning to the results it is worth noting that temptation to spend the
money elsewhere is by no means the only motivation for skipping a payment. The
money could, for example, have been invested in a project that pays only after several
months and the higher return more than makes up for paying higher interest. In
addition, it is not obvious whether a present-biased borrower should repay sooner
or later than a time consistent borrower. The present-biased borrower may, for
example, be aware of her bias and know that if she does not stick to a rigid repayment
schedule, she will not be able to meet her financial obligations at the end of the year
when the loan is due. This is no doubt an interesting theoretical question to study,
but beyond the scope of this paper. The analysis here remains agnostic to what one
should expect on a theoretical basis and only studies the correlations in the data.
Table 3.2 lists various financial outcome variables and correlates them with in-
dividual level characteristics, including a dummy for whether or not the individual
appeared present or future-biased. The regressions in this table are run on the en-
tire sample of participants, that is participants from all treatments combined. Since
the indicator variables for being future and present-biased are themselves estimated,
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Table 3.2: Determinants of financial decision making
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Has A Late Bank Has A Late Group Size of Size of
Bank Loan Payments Group Loan Payments Bank Loan Group Loan
Presentbias 0.20 0.68 -0.22 -3.38** 3,249 -743
(0.15) (1.44) (0.15) (1.48) (2,588) (2,209)
Futurebias 0.11 0.82 -0.04 -1.96 3,268* -96
(0.11) (1.06) (0.10) (1.48) (1,908) (394)
Meanincome -0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 -13 3
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (14) (4)
Literate 0.63*** 0.62 -0.38* -7.63** 7,683** -1,932
(0.22) (2.18) (0.22) (3.27) (3,423) (1,268)
IQ 0.02 -0.03 0.02 -0.96*** 399 102
(0.04) (0.34) (0.04) (0.30) (609) (149)
Education -0.22 -0.38 0.13 4.86** -919 843
(0.16) (1.32) (0.16) (1.89) (2,572) (805)
crra 0.02 0.22 0.08** -0.29 -323 371***
(0.04) (0.37) (0.03) (0.42) (654) (130)
Age 0.00 -0.04 -0.00 0.03 114 1
(0.00) (0.04) (0.00) (0.08) (81) (16)
Constant 0.12 2.64 0.19 7.29** -8,631** -1,454*
(0.22) (2.76) (0.22) (3.50) (4,048) (861)
Sigma 6,793*** 1,403***
(874) (150)
Observations 99 47 99 35 99 99
Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3.3: OLS estimates on whether or not the participant has a bank loan broken
down by treatments. The estimates of present- and future-bias obtained in treatment
1 correlated significantly with the decision to obtain a bank loan, while in income
risk treatments the correlations remain insignificant.
Participant has a bank loan: yes/no
(1) (2) (3)
Treatment 1 Treament 2 Treatment 3
Presentbias 0.38** 0.13 0.22
(0.18) (0.28) (0.28)
Futurebias 0.10 0.27 -0.01
(0.21) (0.25) (0.21)
Income -0.00 -0.00 -0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Literate 0.40 0.41 0.74
(0.36) (0.50) (0.68)
IQ 0.02 -0.04 0.12**
(0.09) (0.07) (0.05)
Education -0.04 -0.01 -0.27
(0.26) (0.35) (0.38)
CRRA 0.08 -0.06 -0.04
(0.06) (0.07) (0.06)
Age 0.01 0.00 -0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Constant 0.11 0.53 -0.20
(0.49) (0.46) (0.34)
Observations 32 34 36
R-squared 0.26 0.19 0.43
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3.4: Tobit estimates on the size of the bank loan broken down by treatments.
Again, the estimates of present- and future-bias obtained in treatment 1 are the only
ones which significantly correlate with the outcome variable.
(1) (2) (3)
Presentbias 6,500** 1,996 -5,546
(3,176) (7,245) (16,950)
Futurebias 4,341* 5,697 -3,486
(2,433) (5,233) (6,913)
Income 0 -27 -12
(30) (28) (65)
Literate 10,421* 1,978 14,471
(5,632) (10,222) (24,819)
IQ 37 -340 5,150
(1,101) (1,780) (4,355)
Education -2,972 3,016 -2,570
(3,836) (9,217) (13,052)
CRRA -262 -1,335 -1,929
(679) (2,070) (4,384)
Age 194* -39 -111
(117) (227) (495)
Constant -8,886 2,275 -21,940
(5,700) (10,529) (19,677)
Sigma 4,496*** 6,676*** 5,422**
(732) (2,301) (2,229)
Observations 32 34 36
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
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standard errors are bootstrapped. Results under robust standard errors are similar,
although slightly more significant in places.
Columns (1) looks at the characteristics of who has a loan from a bank and the
only significant correlation is that literate women are more likely to have a loan from
a bank. Column (2) focuses on those participants who do have a bank account and
studies the number of missed/late payments. Column (3) looks at the characteristics
of women with an intragroup loan and colummn (4) looks at the number of missed
payments for the intragroup loan. Interestingly, present-biased woman repay their
loans significantly faster than time consistent women. Columns (5) and (6) are tobit
regressions on the loan size for both bank and intragroup loans. OLS regressions, as
well as the Heckman two-step model, give similar results.
Overall, it appears that our estimates of present- and future-bias do not correlate
very strongly with most financial outcome variables. With the exception of number of
late payments for the intragroup loan and size of bank loan, they remain insignificant
throughout. However, as was demonstrated in the previous section, estimates from
treatment 2 and 3 have been affected by the experiment and are therefore less likely
to correspond to the true parameters than those in treatment 1. To see if the
measurement error thus introduced has affected the correlations, I next repeat some
of these regressions for each treatment separately. For the repayment behaviour the
sample size unfortunately becomes too small at the treatment group level, hence
these cannot be broken down any further.
Table 3.3 shows the results for whether or not the participant has a bank loan.
As we can see the coefficient on being present-biased has become significant, despite
the fact that the sample size is reduced to a third. In the remaining treatments
the correlations remain insignificant. The point estimates are not all significantly
different from each other; however, a researcher who ran these regressions in an
environment in which participants have no income uncertainty (treatment 1) and
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a researcher who ran the same regressions in an environment where participants
do face income uncertainty (treatments 2 and 3) would have drawn very different
conclusions. The most accurate estimates clearly seem to be the ones elicited for
participants in treatment 1 and the measurement error introduced by uncertainty in
the other treatments has influenced the estimates of time inconsistency so far that
correlations with outcome variables of interest have become insignificant.
The same exercise is repeated in table 3.4 for the size of the bank loan 10 . Again,
despite the reduced sample size, estimates of the coefficients on being present- and
future-biased have become more significant for the subsample of participants in
treatment 1 and have become insignificant for treatments 2 and 3.
It is also interesting that the point estimates on future-and present-biased appear
to be both positive. In fact, throughout most regressions we see that point estimates
on present and future-biased are in the same direction. This suggests that future-
and present-biasedness are in some way related and maybe displaying future-biased
preferences is even a way of trying to commit to not spending money immediately
and hence guaranteeing future income. Trying to differentiate between participants
who are ‘truly’ future-biased and present-biased participants who want to commit to
having savings in the future is therefore an interesting avenue for further research.
This section has demonstrated that future- and present-bias do correlate with
important financial decisions and that the extent to which this correlation is ob-
servable can depend on the risk environment in which these parameters are elicited.
Researchers wishing to elicit estimates of time inconsistencies therefore may wish to
offer insurance payments such as were offered in treatment 1 in this experiment in
order to obtain the most accurate preferences possible.
10Once again similar results hold for OLS and Heckman two-step procedures
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3.8 Conclusion
This experiment exposed subjects to exogenously induced variation in the riskiness
of their income stream over the next three weeks and tested to what extent this
affected elicited discount factors. It clearly affected current and future discount
factors differently with the current discount factor being entirely unresponsive to
changes in riskiness and with the future discount factor increasing in riskiness. This
implies that in treatment groups with risky income, more participants appeared
present-biased and fewer participants appeared future-biased, thereby significantly
affecting the distribution of biases.
Finally, this study also shows that the discount parameters elicited under safe
income streams correlate more significantly with actual financial decision making
than discount factors elicited under risky income streams. This is suggestive of the
fact that income risk can introduce substantial measurement error in the estimation
of discount factors.
To mitigate this effect, it may be advisable to offer a form of safe income as insur-
ance when eliciting discounting parameters, the way it was done in this experiment
for the safe income treatment. However, further research into the best mechanism
to elicit time preferences in developing countries is clearly needed.
Chapter 4
Microfinance and Projection
Bias Over Habit Formation
Abstract
This paper shows how several characteristics of the microfinance industry can be
explained by the behavioural phenomenon of projection bias over habit formation.
Evidence from psychology suggests that humans have a tendency to underestimate
to what extent their future preferences will differ from their current preferences.
This systematic and predictable bias has become known as projection bias. With
the help of a formal theoretical model, this paper demonstrates that the prevalence
of flat interest rate calculations, the high frequency of repayments, and the problem
of over-investment can all be explained by this particular bias. Importantly, the
policy implications resulting from this theory can differ from those of other prevailing
models, such as hyperbolic discounting.
Keywords: Projection Bias, Flat Interest Rates, Repayment Frequency, Over-
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4.1 Introduction
Microfinance was once heralded as the panacea for global poverty. The economic ra-
tionale was straightforward: the poor had previously been excluded from the world’s
capital markets and microfinance would connect them. This would allow them to
undertake small-stake, high-return projects and eventually lead them out of poverty.
The reality has been somewhat sobering in comparison: there has been anecdotal
evidence1 of over-indebted borrowers facing intimidation and threats when missing
repayments and according to Roodman (2011) “the best estimate on the average
impact of microcredit on poverty has been zero”. This has given rise to debates
in policy and academia about whether or not microfinance, or which aspects of
microfinance, improve welfare.
At the same time, the discipline of economics has re-discovered psychology as
an important component of human decision making. The subfield of behavioural
economics has hence begun to influence mainstream economic thought as well as
economic policy (Angner and Loewenstein (2007), Camerer (2002)). Particularly in
development economics, insights from psychology have proven to be useful, not only
in understanding decision making, but also in actively shaping policy interventions
(for example see Mullainathan (2007) or Bertrand et al. (2004)).
The aim of this paper is to connect these two worlds by focusing on one particular
behavioural bias and by demonstrating how it can explain some of the characteristics
of the microfinance industry.
The bias under consideration here is projection bias over habit formation. In-
sights from psychology lead us to believe that accurately predicting one’s future
preferences, habit levels and tastes is something humans find extremely difficult to
do (Loewenstein and Adler (1995) and Loewenstein and Van Boven (2003), etc.).
1For example, see http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-11997571 .
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In fact, as section 4.2 will outline in greater detail, there is abundant evidence that
humans underestimate to what extent the future will differ from the present and
this predictable bias is known as projection bias.
The characteristics of the microfinance industry that can be explained with the
help of this bias include over-investment, frequent repayment and the presence of
flat interest rate calculations and high interest rates in general. 2
The prevalence of flat interest calculations is usually explained by the fact that
the lender can advertise a low interest rate while charging a very high effective in-
terest rate. “Why did such a system appear in lending? The answer is obvious and
cannot be debated: it allows the institution to charge nearly twice as much inter-
est for the quoted interest rate as with the declining balance method” (Waterfield
(2008)).
This paper, however, shows that with concave utility, borrowers may consciously
choose the contract with the more expensive flat interest rate because it does not
force them to have an increasing consumption profile. In itself, this would not be
a problem, but for agents who are subject to projection bias over habit formation
this will lead to a substantial loss in welfare. When offered the choice between the
optimal, decreasing repayment profile and one of flat interest payments, the borrower
will prefer the flat interest payment, thereby reducing overall welfare.
A second characteristic of the microfinance industry is the high frequency of
repayments. Estimates suggest that the cost associated with the weekly repayment
meetings are a substantial component of the overall cost of operation (Karduck and
Seibel (2004), Shankar (2007)). Empirical studies, randomizing between weekly and
monthly repayment schedules (Field and Pande (2008), Mcintosh (2008) ) have found
2With a flat interest rate calculation the interest payment for each instalment is calculated
on the original principal and not on the remainder which is still outstanding, thereby implying a
significantly higher APR or effective interest rate. This is in contrast to the ‘declining balance
method’ in which the interest is calculated only on what is still owed to the lender. (See CGAP
(2002) for a detailed comparison of all kinds of interest rate calculations used by MFIs).
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no negative impact on repayment rates thus suggesting that MFIs could substantially
lower costs by reducing the number of meetings.
However, this paper shows that for borrowers who suffer from projection bias
over habit formation, the high transaction cost associated with frequent meetings is
more than compensated for by the gain in welfare from repaying large instalments
quickly. Secondly, it will be shown that when borrowers exhibit habit formation
and when contract enforcement is incomplete, frequent repayments make it easier
to satisfy the repayment incentive constraint. This is similar to the result of Fischer
and Ghatak (2009) who show that the repayment incentive constraint for hyperbolic
discounters is easier to satisfy when repayments are frequent.3
Finally, the paper will demonstrate that when borrowers are not aware of their
habit changing over time, they will overestimate the marginal utility of future in-
come and will therefore over-invest. Over-indebtedness of microfinance borrowers
has recently emerged as a concern in many south Indian states. Srinivasan (2009)
estimated that “the average debt outstanding is estimated in INR 49, 000 (about
$1000) per household, which is eight times the national average MFI loan outstand-
ing and about 11 times the average member-level loan outstanding in case of SHGs”.
This trend in recent years has sparked demand for regulatory intervention such as
the establishment of credit bureaus in order to limit the number of sources one
individual borrower can borrow from simultaneously.
The paper proceeds as follows: the next section gives further background on
projection bias and provides evidence for its existence. The next section gives back-
ground and evidence on the existence of projection bias. Section 4.3 introduces the
basic model, Section 4.4 explains why borrowers prefer a flat repayment schedule
3Jain and Mansuri (2003) give another interesting interpretation for why frequent repayments
may be necessary. In their model the high frequency forces the borrower to use a moneylender who
can screen the individual borrowers directly, thereby solving the adverse selection problem for the
MFI.
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and may therefore be willing to accept flat interest calculations. Section 4.5 shows
that altruistic lenders have an incentive to hold frequent repayments when borrow-
ers suffer from projection bias over habit, despite potentially incurring very large
transaction costs. Section 4.6 outlines how frequent repayments can help overcome
enforcement problems and section 4.7 shows that agents suffering from projection
bias will over-invest in a given project and will therefore over-borrow. Section 4.8
discusses and compares the model relative to one of hyperbolic discounting and
Section 4.9 concludes.
4.2 Background
The defining feature of projection bias is that agents do not (fully) understand that
their preferences evolve over time. All inter-temporal transactions, such as saving
and borrowing, require actors to accurately predict their future preferences. For
example, when deciding whether or not to save up money in order to invest in
a project, agents must predict how much utility they will derive once the project
starts to pay off and how much disutility they will have to endure while saving up
the money.
The inability to do so accurately is what Loewenstein et al. (2003) have coined
projection bias. Gilbert (2006) refers to it as ‘presentism’ and defines it as ‘the
tendency for current experience to influence one’s view of the past and the future.’
Examples of projection bias can be found in virtually all domains of life: It is the
tendency to overestimate future hunger when doing grocery shopping on an empty
stomach and to underestimate it when shopping on a sated stomach (Nisbett and
Kanouse (1969)). Sackett and Torrance (1978) find that non-patients’ prediction
of quality of life under chronic dialysis is consistently lower than that reported by
actual dialysis patients. Conlin et al. (2007) find that people are more likely to
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regret the purchase of a ‘cold-weather’ item if they have bought it on a particularly
cold day.
Most related to the current paper is the evidence of projection bias over habit
formation. Acland and Levy (2010) find evidence of projection bias over habit in
gym attendances. In their sample, two thirds of participants develop a habit of
attending the gym after having been given short run incentives to do so. However,
ex ante they failed to predict 90% of that habit. While habit formation over gym
attendance may not be exactly the same as habit formation over past consumption,
Muellbauer (1988) also finds evidence of the fact that people generally understand
that their habit levels over consumption change over time but that again, they
underestimate the extent to which this happens. Finally, Badger et al. (2007) find
that heroin addicts value an extra dose of the heroin substitute Buprenorphine more
highly when they are currently craving than when they are currently satiated. Taken
together, there is compelling evidence that people tend to underestimate to what
extent current consumption will affect the marginal utility of future consumption,
which is the bias being modelled in this paper.
4.3 The Environment
The utility function of the agent is subject to habit formation and is given by U(ct, st)
where ct is consumption and st is the habit stock of the agent in period t. The initial
habit stock s1 is for simplicity set to equal zero. This is not without loss of generality.
A large initial habit stock,in particular, is likely going to result in a different optimal
consumption plan involving the agent ‘ breaking the habit’ and going through an
initial period of very little consumption. However, setting the initial habit stock
equal to zero is a realistic assumption in the setting of microfinance entrepreneurs.
The future habit stock evolves according to st+1 = (1 − γ)st + γct for some
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γ ∈ (0, 1]. Hence, the more the agent consumes in one period, the higher his future
habit stock will be. The parameter γ captures how quickly the habit stock adjusts
over time.
The instantaneous utility function is simply given by v(ct − st) with v′ > 0 and
v′′ < 0. Hence a fully rational agent will choose a consumption path to maximize
his true lifetime utility given by U(ct, st) = v(c1 − s1) + v(c2 − s2).
Agents who suffer from projection bias however cannot fully predict how their
future utility is affected by habit accumulation. There are various ways of modelling
this misprediction and this paper follows the approach taken by Loewenstein et al.
(2003). Let perceived lifetime utility at t = 1 be
U˜(ct, st|s1) = (1− α)U(ct, st) + αU(ct, s1)
= v(c1 − s1) + (1− α)
(
v(c2 − s2)
)
+ α
(
v(c2 − s1)
)
.
That is perceived utility is equal to a weighted average between actual future utility
and future utility if the habit state remained unchanged. Full projection bias, given
by α = 1, would imply that the agent is completely unaware of his habit changing
over time. If α = 0 the agent predicts his future utility correctly and exhibits no
projection bias at all.4
4.4 Borrowing on Flat Interest Rates
Borrowers live for 2 periods and have access to a project which requires a lump sum
investment of 1 unit of capital. If undertaken, this project produces x output in
each of the two periods. This could, for example, be the acquisition of a buffalo or
goat, a rickshaw, or a sewing machine. Borrowers are assumed to have no capital and
4An alternative formulation would be to allow the agent to realize that his habit stock will adjust,
but to underestimate the extent to which this happens. For example see Muellbauer (1988)
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cannot save towards this project. Hence, in order to undertake the project, they must
borrow the funds from a lender. The lender is free to require a repayment ti, i ∈ 1, 2
in either or in both periods. In order to highlight the effects of projection bias on
welfare, this section is going to assume that repayments are always enforceable and
that default hence never occurs.
This section introduces a simplified version of the model which nonetheless gives
insight into the mechanisms at play. In particular, the simplification is that:
Assumption 2. The agent cannot save or borrow between periods.
This means that by controlling the repayment requirements in each period, the
lender can effectively control the borrower’s consumption in each period. After
subtracting the repayment, the borrower’s consumption will be x − t1 in period 1
and x − t2 in period 2. This assumption will be relaxed in the later parts of the
paper and it will be shown that this does not matter. Savings are assumed away
initially only to make the analysis clearer.
Assumption 3. Projection bias is complete. That is, the agent is completely un-
aware of habit formation and in the formulation above α = 1.
While all main results are entirely robust to relaxing these assumptions, the
model is substantially more tractable and the main points are very easy to under-
stand in this simplified setting.
4.4.1 Borrowing from a For-profit
A for-profit lending institution’s aim is simply to maximize profit subject to the
agent’s participation constraint and subject to a break even constraint . If the
lender charges t1 in the first period and t2 in the second period, he formally solves:
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max
t1,t2
t1 + t2
subject to
v(x− t1) + v(x− t2) > u0 (PC)
t1 + t2 ≥ ρ (ZPC)
where ρ is the opportunity cost of capital. This maximization is straightforwardly
solved by noting that the agent prefers to have equal consumption in either period
and hence is willing to pay the most for credit when the payments are exactly equal
t1 = t2. The equilibrium contract will be t
FP
1 = t
FP
2 such that the participation
constraint exactly binds.
4.4.2 Borrowing from an Altruistic Lender
Deriving the optimal contract from the point of view of an altruistic lender gives us
a benchmark relative to which we can compare the contract offered by the for-profit
firm. This could, for example, be an altruistic NGO, a benevolent government or a
social entrepreneur who wishes to maximize the welfare of the poor. The altruistic
lender will then try to structure the loan contract in such a way that it maximizes
actual utility U(ct, st) and hence borrower welfare. The constraints faced by the
lender are (1) the borrower has to be willing to accept the contract offered (the
Participation Constraint or PC) (2) the lender has to break even (the Zero Profit
Condition or ZPC).
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Formally, the lender solves the following problem:
max
t1,t2
v(x− t1) + v((1 − γ)x− t2 + γt1)
subject to
v(x− t1) + v(x− t2) > u0 (PC)
t1 + t2 = ρ (ZPC)
This constrained optimization problem is graphically represented in Figures 4.1
and 4.2. The first figure is drawn for the case in which the participation constraint of
the borrower is not binding and the second is drawn for the case where it is binding.
The borrower is willing to accept any contracts (t1, t2) such that they lie on the
south-west of the participation constraint and the lender is able to break even for
all contracts north east of the ZPC.
Result 1. The optimal repayment schedule is such that the first instalment is larger
than the second instalment, t1 > t2. Agents who are subject to projection bias, in
contrast, prefer a flat repayment schedule such that the instalments are of equal size
t1 = t2.
As can be seen readily from the first diagram, the contract that maximizes bor-
rower welfare has a higher repayment in the first period than in the second, t1 > t2.
This is to induce the borrower to have an increasing consumption profile in which
he consumes more in the second period than in the first. The borrower himself, on
the contrary, would have chosen a flat consumption profile, such that the payments
in either period would have been the same (t1 = t2). As long as the borrower’s par-
ticipation constraint is not binding, this does not matter and the altruistic lender
can induce the borrower to have the optimal consumption plan.
A straightforward extension of this result is that if projection bias is partial, that
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Figure 4.1: The optimal contract case 1: PC not binding
0
0
t 2
t1
E1
PC
Welfare
ZPC
is if the agent has some idea that his habit will be changing over time, but underesti-
mates the effect, the preferred consumption plan will be flatter than optimal. Given
the particular modelling choice of projection bias, this is particularly easy to see.
The agent suffering from partial projection bias will maximize a weighted average
of the utility of an agent without any bias and one with complete projection bias.
In the case of a binding participation constraint, however, the borrower would
refuse the optimal contract and would only be willing to accept one which offers a
lower initial payment. The case shown in Figure 4.2 is one in which the participation
constraint of the borrower and the participation constraint of the lender intersect
in only one place and hence the altruistic lender has no choice as to what contract
to offer. The shaded area depicts the range of contracts (t1, t2) which are pareto
superior to the selected contract, but which are unfeasible as the borrower ex-ante
would not accept such a contract. However, for all these contracts, both the lender’s
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Figure 4.2: The optimal contract case 2: PC binding
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profit would be higher and/or borrower welfare would be greater. The result can be
summarized as follows.
Proposition 8. Under projection bias over habit formation the optimal contract
may not be feasible and the second best contract is such that t1t2 <
t∗
1
t∗
2
Proof. The optimal contract (t∗1, t
∗
2) is given by v
′(x− t∗1) = (1+ γ)v′((1− γ)x−R+
(1− γ)t∗1) and the lender’s zero profit condition t∗1+ t∗2 = R. Since γ > 0 and v′′ < 0
this implies t∗1 > t
∗
2.
The second best contract (t′1, t
′
2) must lie at an intersection of the PC and the
ZPC. To see that this intersection must lie above (higher t1) the first best contract,
we note that the participation constraint is maximized at t1 = t2. The second best
contract (t′1, t
′
2) must therefore lie on the line t1 + t2 = ρ with t
′
1 > t
∗
1.
It is worth noting at this point, that this result would not necessarily hold if the
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bias were of a different form. Hyperbolic discounting, for example, would, in fact,
lead to the opposite result. This will be discussed at greater detail in section 4.8.1.
4.4.3 The Altruistic Lender and the For-Profit Coexist
Next, we consider what happens when the altruistic lender and the for-profit lender
coexist and both offer their preferred contract. As will be shown in the next sub-
section, the borrower will prefer to borrow from the for-profit despite the higher
interest charges, because he prefers the flatter repayment schedule. This can be seen
as an explanation for why flat interest charges remain so popular despite the higher
implied interest rate.
After the static comparison, we show that in equilibrium the two lenders will
offer the same contract. The altruistic lender will accommodate the bias of the
borrowers and offer a flat repayment schedule, but will drive down the interest rate,
thereby eliminating the for-profit’s ability to make positive profits by exploiting the
borrower’s desire for a flat consumption profile. As before, optimal welfare is below
first best, despite the existence of an altruistic lender who would like to offer the
optimal contract.
Static Comparison
As described above, the altruistic lender lends money at the break-even interest rate
such that t∗1 + t
∗
2 = ρ and such that t
∗
1 > t
∗
2. The for-profit on the other hand lends
at higher interest rate such that t′1 + t
′
2 = ρ+ π where π is the profit earned by the
lender, but with t′1 = t
′
2. The two contracts are depicted in Figure 4.3.
The case for which they are drawn illustrates that, while the altruistic lender’s
contract (E1) maximizes borrower welfare, the borrower may well prefer the (more
expensive) contract E2 offered by the for profit because it does not require a high
repayment in the first period.
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Figure 4.3: The Altruistic Lender’s and the For-Profit’s Contract’s Offered Simul-
taneously
t 2
t1
E2⋆
E1⋆
E3
⋆
ZPC
PC
g2(x)
f3(x)
Result 2. For a certain range of interest rates, the borrower prefers the more expen-
sive contract offered by the for-profit to the cheaper contract offered by the altruistic
lender; overall welfare is hence lower.
Proof. As depicted above and directly following from the fact that the borrower
prefers a contract other than the first best contract.
Once again, a hyperbolic discounter would have the opposite preferences and
would, in this case, prefer the cheaper contract offered by the NGO.5
Of course, as the gap between the overall interest rates offered by the altruistic
lender and the for-profit increases, the borrower will at some point prefer the al-
truistic lender’s offer. However, this result can help explain why flat interest rate
5Of course, the for-profit would not be maximizing profits when offering this contract to hyper-
bolic discounters. In equilibrium, the for-profit would offer a more expensive contract with a small
initial payment and a large future payment and the borrower would accept this over the contract
offered by the NGO.
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calculations are still so dominant among microfinance organizations and that their
existence is not necessarily due to the fact that borrowers do not understand how
to calculate interest rates, but due to the fact that they are willing to pay more for
a flatter repayment schedule.
The Equilibrium
In the above analysis, the altruistic lender clearly has an incentive to respond to
the contract offered by the for-profit. By slightly giving in to the temptation of the
borrower and by making the repayment profile slightly flatter, the altruistic lender
could again attract the borrower.
Proposition 9. The unique equilibrium in the credit market is such that t1 = t2
and t1 + t2 = ρ
Proof. For all t1+ t2 < ρ, the break-even condition is violated and lending is unfea-
sible. For all t1 + t2 > ρ, the altruistic lender can offer a contract preferred by the
agent and associated with higher welfare by offering the contract above.
For all t1 > t2, the for-profit can offer a contract preferred by the borrower, but
with lower welfare.
For all t1 < t2, both for-profit and altruistic lender can offer a contract that offers
higher profits or higher welfare respectively and is preferred by the borrower.
In Figure 4.3, this equilibrium corresponds to point E3 and represents the point
which maximizes the borrower’s perceived utility in period 1. While this is not the
first best contract, the existence of the altruistic lender has led to a reduction in the
interest rate while maintaining the same repayment schedule, and has therefore led
to a significant increase in borrower welfare.
It is important to note that the existence of an altruistic lender is not the only
means to achieve this equilibrium. The same equilibrium results from either two for-
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profit lenders in Bertrand competition with each other or several lenders in perfect
competition.
4.5 Frequency I - Transaction Costs
The previous section demonstrated that projection bias over habit formation can
explain why flat interest calculations remain so popular among microfinance institu-
tions. This section turns to demonstrating how projection bias can help explain the
high frequency of repayments in microfinance. The analysis from the previous sec-
tion already demonstrated that the optimal t1 is never equal to zero, which implies
that two, more frequent, payments are preferable to one single repayment in period
2. However, the odds were clearly stacked in favour of frequent repayment due to
two assumptions: first, the agent did not have access to savings so the lender was
offering to smooth consumption for the borrower. In fact, in the absence of a savings
technology, concave utility alone is enough to give rise to a demand for frequent re-
payments as opposed to a single repayment. This section will show that in a model
with savings, concave utility alone is not enough to reach this conclusion. Projection
bias over habit formation, however, provides reason to have multiple payments as
opposed to a single repayment.
Second, the previous section did not allow for any transaction costs associated
with meetings. This section relaxes this assumption and shows that the altruistic
lender and the for-profit lending institution will react differently to the presence of
transaction costs. The altruistic lender is likely to stick with a multiple repayment
schedule even for very high transaction costs, while the for-profit will find it optimal
to switch to a single repayment under far smaller transaction costs.
If the borrower has to attend two meetings instead of one (if t1 6= 0), he bears an
additional transaction cost τ which, for simplicity, enters his utility additively. The
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borrower perceives his utility to be given by v(x− t1)+ v(x− t2)− τ1(t1 6= 0), hence
he will use his ability to save in order to smooth consumption as much as possible
between periods. There are two possible cases:
1. t1 > t2 : In this case the borrower is unable to completely smooth consumption
between periods and will simply consume x− t1 in the first period and x− t2
in the second period. The analysis from the previous section therefore applies
directly
2. t1 ≤ t2 : In this case the borrower will save the excess between each period and
will therefore consume x− 12(t1+ t2) in period 1 and x− 12(t1+ t2) in period 2.
4.5.1 Borrowing from a For-Profit
As before, the for-profit lender maximizes profit subject to the borrower’s participa-
tion constraint and the lender’s break-even constraint:
max
t1,t2
t1 + t2
subject to
v(cR1 ) + v(c
R
2 )− τ1(t1 > 0) > u0 (B-PC)
t1 + t2 ≥ ρ (L-PC)
Where cRi is given by c
R
i ≡ argmaxc{v(c1) + v(c2)|c1 ≤ x − t1 & c1 + c2 ≤
2x − t1 − t2}, the optimal consumption plan in response to the contract offered
by the lender and given the no-borrowing constraint, but in presence of a savings
technology in order to transfer income from the first period to the second.
This straightforward maximization problem is once again depicted in Figure 4.4.
As can be seen on the diagram, the point that maximizes profits is now given by the
single repayment point E3 for which t1 = 0. The borrower derives equal perceived
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Figure 4.4: In the presence of transaction costs, the For-Profit will prefer a single
repayment over multiple repayments
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
t 2
t1
E3.{
τ
PC
U
utility from all points such that t1 ≤ t2 and t1 6= 0, because he will be able to achieve
his desired level of consumption smoothing (c1 = c2). However at t1 = 0 in addition
to achieving the desired level of consumption smoothing, he will also be able to save
τ in transaction costs and hence is willing to pay the highest interest rate for this
contract.
When the borrower is able to smooth consumption by himself and when addi-
tional repayment meetings are costly, the for-profit will prefer a single repayment
over multiple repayments. Welfare, however, will be significantly lowered by this.
The welfare maximizing repayment schedule, holding constant the profits to the for-
profit, is given by the tangency condition of the welfare indifference curve U and
the profit line depicted in the diagram. Such a contract, however, is not within the
borrowers participation constraint and would therefore never be accepted.
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4.5.2 Borrowing from an Altruistic Lender
The altruistic lender solves:
max
t1,t2
v(x− t1) + v((1 − γ)x− t2 + γt1)
subject to
v(cR1 ) + v(c
R
2 ) + τ1(t1 > 0) > u0 (B-PC)
t1 + t2 = ρ (L-PC)
Where again cRi ≡ argmaxc{v(c1) + v(c2)|c1 ≤ x− t1 & c1 + c2 ≤ 2x − t1 − t2}
is the optimal consumption plan, given the contract offered by the lender.
Again, we can differentiate between the two separate cases: 1) the PC does not
bind and 2) the PC does bind. In the first case, the altruistic lender will either
choose the same contract it did in the previous section, or if the transaction cost is
prohibitively high, it will also reduce the number of repayments to 1. This is depicted
in Figure 4.5: For transaction costs higher than the τ depicted in the figure, the
lender will choose the single repayment plan E5, but for all transaction costs smaller
than that, the unconstrained first best contract E4 with multiple payments will be
selected. The fact that the borrower can save, however, has in no way affected the
optimal contract because the altruistic lender would like to charge t1 > t2 and hence
the borrower would not want to make use of his ability to save.
In the case of a binding participation constraint, the lender once again can only
offer the contract lying at the intersection point between the participation constraint
and the break-even line. In case of multiplicity, the contract with the highest t1,
and hence highest level of welfare, will be selected by the altruistic lender.
The results of this section can therefore be summarized as follows:
Result 3. Under perfect contract enforcement, access to savings and a positive trans-
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Figure 4.5: For small transaction costs, the altruistic lender will select a repayment
plan involving multiple repayments such as the one at E4. For large transaction
costs the altruistic lender will select the single repayment plan E5.
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action cost, a for-profit lender will offer a single repayment plan. An altruistic lender
however, will offer multiple repayments unless the transaction cost is prohibitively
high.
The high frequency of repayments often observed in microfinance should therefore
not be seen as purely introducing high transaction costs, but it may also in fact be
an important feature of the contract.
This section showed that when agents are subject to projection bias over habit
formation, it can be welfare improving if they are forced to accept a frequent re-
payment contract instead of a single repayment contract. This result holds even
when there are non-trivial transaction costs associated with attending more than
one meeting. The intuition behind this is that by having early repayments, the
contract can help the agent in achieving an optimal, upward sloping consumption
profile.
4.6 Frequency II - Incomplete Contract Enforcement
The result in the previous section is driven by the fact that the altruistic lender has
an informational advantage over the borrower. The lender knows the actual utility
function of the borrower better than the borrower himself and wants to indirectly
control the borrower’s consumption plan by choosing the appropriate repayment
schedule. This section is going to relax the assumption that contracts are always
enforceable and will thereby introduce another reason why the lending institution
might want to have frequent repayments, regardless of whether they are maximizing
their own profit or the borrower’s utility. This section is going to demonstrate this
for the case of a for-profit, but the analysis is identical for the case of an altruistic
lender.
The intuition behind the results in this section is that subsequent payments will
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be easier to enforce if they are smaller in size. In the case of a large final repayment,
the temptation to not fulfil the repayment requirement is larger than if the final
repayment is relatively smaller.
Formally, this section assumes that the lender has access to an incomplete non-
monetary punishment of Ψ to threaten a defaulting borrower with. This punishment
could take any form, ranging from legal prosecution to social stigma and ostracism. A
borrower hence chooses to make a repayment by comparing the utility from repaying
to the utility from defaulting.
In the first period, the borrower decides to make the first repayment if and
only if his expected utility from repaying is greater than his expected utility from
defaulting:
v(cR1 ) + v(c
R
2 ) > v(c
D
1 ) + v(c
D
2 )−Ψ (IC-1)
where
cRi ≡ argmax
c
{v(c1) + v(c2)|c1 ≤ x− t1 & c1 + c2 ≤ 2x− t1 − t2
is the optimal consumption plan if the borrower decides to repay and
cDi ≡ argmax
c
{v(c1) + v(c2)|c1 ≤ x & c1 + c2 ≤ 2x}
is the optimal consumption plan if the borrower chooses to default.
Note that for this first period incentive constraint (IC-1), the borrower is not
aware of his habit changing over time. He weighs his utility from repaying the loan
against the utility of defaulting on the loan under the assumption that his habit
level remains unchanged. In the second period, however, the borrower’s incentive
constraint has adapted to the new habit level:
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v(cR2 − γcR1 ) ≥ v(cDD2 − γcR1 )−Ψ (4.1)
where
cDD2 ≡ argmax
c
{v(c2 − γcR1 )|c2 ≤ 2x− cR1 − t1}
is the level of consumption in period 2 if the borrower defaults on the second
instalment, after having repaid the first. In this second period, consumption would
simply be all the funds left to the borrower after having repaid the first instalment
and after having consumed cR1 in the first period. Hence we can rewrite the second
period incentive constraint as:
v(cR2 − γcR1 ) ≥ v(2x− cR1 − t1 − γcR1 )−Ψ (IC-2)
A for-profit lender hence maximizes profit subject to 4 constraints: the borrower’s
and the lender’s participation constraint, the borrower’s first period incentive con-
straint (IC-1) and the borrower’s second period incentive constraint (IC-2).
Formally, the lender solves the following problem:
max
t1,t2
t1 + t2
subject to
v(cR1 ) + v(c
R
2 ) > u0 (B-PC)
t1 + t2 ≥ ρ (L-PC)
v(cR1 ) + v(c
R
2 ) > v(c
D
1 ) + v(c
D
2 )−Ψ (IC-1)
v(cR2 − γcR1 ) ≥ v(2x− cR1 − t1 − γcR1 )−Ψ (IC-2)
Closer examination of these constraints reveals that the first period incentive
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constraint and the participation constraint can never bind at the same time. The
right hand side of either constraint is identical and equal to the expected utility, as
perceived in the first period, of borrowing from the lender and repaying the loan. The
right hand side of either constraint is independent of t1 and t2. For the participation
constraint it is simply the outside option and for the incentive constraint it is the
utility from defaulting on the repayments. The utility of neither of these depends on
the contract offered by the lender and hence both are constants in this maximization
problem.
The IC-1 and the PC therefore can be combined into one single constraint of the
form
v(cR1 ) + v(c
R
2 ) ≥ u′0 (PC’)
where u′0 = max{u0, v(cD1 ) + v(cD2 ) − Ψ}. The combined constraint resembles
the original participation constraint in shape and form, with the exception that the
parameter Ψ, the ability to enforce contracts, can shift this constraint outward up
until the point of the original participation constraint.
The simplified maximization problem is depicted in Figure 4.6 below. The only
addition relative to previous figures is the second period incentive constraint (IC-2).
This constraint, potentially, imposes an upper limit on the second period repayment
t2 above which repayment in the second period will no longer be incentive compatible.
This works through two separate channels.
First, it is easier to repay a smaller amount in the second period because the
benefit of defaulting is smaller. A borrower who has saved up large sums of money
and has to choose between spending them on consumption or repayment will have a
higher gain from defaulting. The second channel is that a borrower who has repaid
a higher amount in the past has accumulated a lower habit stock and the marginal
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Figure 4.6: Imperfect enforcement introduces another constraint, IC-2. If the second
instalment is too large, the borrower will find it optimal to default instead of repaying
since his marginal utility of consumption has, unexpectedly, increased in the second
period. The new equilibrium is E6 at the intersection of the participation constraint
and the incentive compatibility constraint.
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utility of consumption is therefore smaller.
Proposition 10. Under incomplete contract enforcement, a for-profit lending insti-
tution will prefer multiple repayments over a single repayment because this weakens
the repayment incentive constraint of the borrower.
Proof. If the second period incentive constraint (IC-2) is not binding, the problem
is identical to the one outlined in the previous section and the for-profit lender will
choose a single repayment schedule.
If, however, the second period incentive constraint is binding, the optimal con-
tract lies on the line between the corner solution (intersection between IC-2 and PC)
and the point t1 = t2. The borrower is indifferent between all contracts along this
line because he will be able to smooth consumption by saving between periods 1 and
2.
4.7 Over-investing
Projection bias over habit formation may also explain the phenomenon of over-
borrowing and investing as borrowers anticipate their investments and purchases to
give more future utility than they actual will. This will induce borrowers to take
on larger loans than they should optimally opt for. This effect is similar to that
of hyperbolic discounting which may also induce borrowers to over-invest, but the
mechanism at play is different. Instead of undervaluing the future cost of repaying,
as hyperbolic discounters might, the agent is too optimistic about the future benefits.
Assume again that the agent lives for 2 periods and receives an exogenous income
of w in both periods of his life. His utility function remains the same as in the
previous sections. In period 1, he has the option of buying a bulky consumption
good valued b(y) at y units of capital invested into it with b′() > 0, b′′(). An example
of such a consumption good could be a wedding or a funeral, for which the utility is
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increasing in the amount of money spent.
The agent has the opportunity of borrowing funds i in addition to his per-period
income of w from a lender at rate r. The agent suffering from projection bias will
choose the amount to borrow i such that his perceived life-time income
U˜ = v(b(w + i)) + v((w − i(1 + r))) (4.2)
is maximized. Of course the agent will only borrow from the lender if the optimal
investment is greater than the per period income w. In other words, the marginal
benefit of investing in b() has to be sufficiently high for the agent to want to borrow
money. For the remainder of the analysis we assume this to be the case.
Assumption 4. v′(b(w))b′(w) > v′(w)
Under this assumption the agent will borrow amount i′ given by the first order
condition
v′(b(w + i′))b′(w + i′)) = (1 + r)v′(w − i′(1 + r)) (4.3)
The borrower’s actual life-time utility after borrowing i units of capital, however,
is given by
U = v(b(w + i)) + v(w − i(1 + r)− γb(i)). (4.4)
Once again the only difference between U˜ and U is the fact that one includes
the habit term, in this case γb(i), and the other does not. The agent suffering from
projection bias does not understand that high consumption in the first period of his
life will make it more painful to consume little in the second period. By ignoring
this effect he will choose an excessively high level of consumption in the first period
and will over-invest.
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The optimal level of investment, i∗, taking account of the effects current con-
sumption has on future consumption, is given by the first order condition
v′(b(w + i∗))b′(w + i∗)) = (1 + r + γb′(i∗))v′(w − i∗(1 + r)− γb(i∗)) (4.5)
Proposition 11. A borrower suffering from projection bias will borrow more than
optimal, i′ > i∗
Proof. Follows directly from comparing equations 4.4 and 4.5. The left hand sides
of both equations are identical and strictly increasing in i and the right hand side
is strictly decreasing in i. For a given i, the right hand side of equation 4.5 is
unambiguously greater than the right hand side of equation 4.4. Hence i∗ < i′.
Intuitively this result is straightforward. The agent suffering from projection
bias is unaware of the negative externality of borrowing i and hence overborrowers.
4.8 Discussion and Comparison To Hyperbolic Discount-
ing
Many of these features in the credit market have previously been explained by hy-
perbolic discounting, the tendency to be impatient now and patient later. Fischer
and Ghatak (2009), for example, show how this can explain the high frequency in
repayments. While I am not aware of any formal theory linking flat interest calcu-
lations to hyperbolic discounting, it would be straightforward to write down such a
model.
Hence, it is important to understand why there is a need for yet another be-
havioural theory and exactly how these two differ in their interpretations. As will
be shown in more detail below, one major difference between the two theories is
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their welfare implication. For example, hyperbolic discounting may be able to ex-
plain why flat interest calculations remain common, but unlike projection bias over
habit formation, the flat shape of the repayment schedule itself does not imply any
welfare cost. While hyperbolic discounting can lead to over-borrowing or to bor-
rowing at a higher than optimal interest rate, it cannot explain the prevalence of
flat repayment schedules. In fact, a hyperbolic discounter would prefer to opt for a
payment schedule with higher repayments in future periods and lower repayments
in the current period.
4.8.1 A Small Model on Hyperbolic Discounting
In order to formalize the intuition outlined above, consider an agent who discounts
the future hyperbolically. Formally, the borrower discounts utility in t periods in
the future according to:
δ(t) =
1
1 + kt
(4.6)
In our two period model, we have only two different discount rates. In period zero,
the agent discounts utility in period 1 with δ1 =
1
1+k and in period 2 with δ2 =
1
1+2k .
However, once the agent is in period 1, he will discount utility in period 2 with δ1
again.
This section will outline a partial analysis of the lending market, by looking only
at the borrower participation constraint and welfare, which are the only components
in which the two models differ. To keep matter simple, we are going to assume once
again that the agent cannot save. As before, the borrower has the option to borrow
from a lender and repay in two instalments such that t1 + t2 = R and in return he
can undertake a project that yields x in each period.
The utility maximizing choices of the agent in period zero are usually interpreted
as the welfare maximizing choices of the agent. This is what the agent would like to
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commit to, but may find himself unable to, because in period 1 he will renegotiate
his decision. Despite its obvious weaknesses, we will follow this approach and treat
the period zero utility maximizing contract to be the welfare maximizing contract.
The contract which is actually chosen in period 1 will then be compared relative to
this benchmark.
The Period Zero Agent - The Welfare Maximizing Contract
As in the previous section, the agent in period zero will choose the contract that
equalizes his marginal utilities from either period.
δ1v
′(x− t∗1)− δ2v′(x− t∗2) = 0 (4.7)
⇒ δ1
δ2
=
v′(x− t∗2)
v′(x− t∗1)
(4.8)
which implies that the optimal contract is involves t∗1 < t
∗
2. This is the first difference
to the model on projection bias: the optimal contract should imply a decreasing
consumption profile, not an increasing one.
The Period One Agent - The Chosen Contract
While the above contract is optimal from the eyes of a period zero agent, in period
one the optimality condition is given by:
v′(x− t∗1)− δ1v′(x− t∗2) (4.9)
⇒ 1
δ1
=
v′(x− t2)
v′(x− t1) (4.10)
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The first thing to note is that the optimal contract and the actually chosen con-
tract will only coincide if δ2 = δ
2
1 , that is if the agent is a traditional, exponential
discounter.
We can then compare the two expressions to understand in which direction hy-
perbolic discounting biases the chosen contract relative to the optimal contract.
Since δ21 =
1
(1+k)2
< 11+2k = δ2, we know that the agent will not choose the
optimal contract, but will in fact choose a contract in which the first instalment is
smaller than the optimal first instalment t1 < t
∗
1. To see this more precisely, note
that
δ1
δ2
<
1
δ1
⇒ v
′(x− t∗2)
v′(x− t∗1)
<
v′(x− t2)
v′(x− t1) (4.11)
Combined with the fact that t1 + t2 = R, it follows that x− t1 > x− t∗1 and hence
t′1 < t
∗
1.
This is the well known result that agents who hyperbolically discount the future
will over-consume in the current period relative to the welfare maximizing t = 0
consumption plan. Once the current period begins, the marginal utilities between
the current period and the future period are no longer the same as they were initially
and the agent revises his current consumption upwards.
In this, projection bias and hyperbolic discounting agree in their prediction that
borrowers will choose a contract leading to period 1 consumption which is too high
relative to the optimal, welfare maximizing level.
The results in this section can be summarized as follows:
Result 4. 1. The optimal contract for an agent who discounts the future hyper-
bolically is one in which t∗∗1 < t
∗∗
2 . The optimal contract for someone who
suffers from projection bias is one in which t∗1 > t
∗
2.
2. Both hyperbolic agents and agents suffering from projection bias over habit
formation will select a contract such that the first instalment t1 is less than the
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optimal instalment (t∗1 and t
∗∗
1 ) respectively.
The two models may therefore be able to explain some of the same phenomena
observed in microfinance and other credit markets; however, they are not observa-
tionally equivalent and may even call for different policy interventions.
Banning flat interest calculations and flat repayment schedules, for example,
would improve the welfare of someone suffering from projection bias over habit
formation, but would harm the utility of a hyperbolic discounter. Other innovative
interventions, such as commitment saving products, would increase the welfare of
either borrower.
4.9 Conclusion
Projection bias is the tendency to underestimate to what extent future tastes and
preferences may differ from current tastes and preferences, a phenomenon that has
been frequently observed in many economic and non-economic situations (see Ariely
and Loewenstein (2005) on sexual arousal, Read and Loewenstein (1999) on pain,
Loewenstein and Van Boven (2003) on thirst, Badger et al. (2007) on heroin and
Acland and Levy (2010) on gym attendances).
This paper has shown that projection bias over habit formation, as first formally
modelled by Loewenstein et al. (2003), can theoretically explain many features ob-
served in microfinance. These include the prevalence of flat interest calculations,
frequent repayments and over-borrowing, all of which are difficult to reconcile with
standard economic theory.
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Appendix to Chapter 2
4.10 Proof of Proposition 4
• x ∈ [2r, x˜) : πseq ≥ πsim if
1− β2(r/x)2 − 2β(r/x)2 ≤ 1− r/x+ r/x(1− (1 + β)r/x
2− r/x
⇒β2
(
2(r/x)− (r/x)2
)
+ β
(
3(r/x)− 2(r/x)2
)
− 1 ≥ 0
For β = 1 the above expression holds for all x < x˜ hence it also holds for all β ≥ 1
and x < x˜.
• x < 2r : πseq ≥ πsim if
1− (r/x)− (r/x)2β2 + β(r/x)2 ≤ 1− (r/x)
⇒β2(r/x)2(1− β) ≤ 0
which holds for all β ≥ 1.
• x ≥ x˜ : πseq ≥ πsim if
β2
(
2(r/x)− (r/x)2
)
+ β
(
3(r/x)− 2(r/x)2
)
− 1 ≥ 0 (4.12)
which has as solution for β:
β =
(
(r/x)2 − (r/x))± y√((r/x)− 1)((r/x)− 9/5)
2(2(r/x)− (r/x)2) (4.13)
Hence for all β greater than the positive root above, sequential group lending
has a higher repayment rate than simultaneous or individual lending regardless of
distribution of output.
2
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4.11 Proof of Proposition 5
The minimum amount of official penalty required for individual lending is lower than
for simultaneous group lending iff
(r − ρ)x
r2
≥ −1 ≥
√
1 +
(r − ρ)x2
r3
(4.14)
choosing the positive root for the quadratic for βminsim . For simplicity define y ≡ (r−ρ)xr2
the above inequality becomes:
1 + y ≥
√
1 + yx/r
1 + 2y + y2 ≥ 1 + yx/r
y(2− x/r + y) ≥ 0
since y > 0 and substituting back for y this gives:
x ≥ 2r
ρ
. (4.15)
Hence for all x ≥ 2rρ we have βminind ≥ βminsim and hence the minimum penalty required
for simultaneous group lending is greater than for individual lending.
2
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Figure 4.7: The mean number of patient choices does not vary significantly across
treatments in the first multiple price list (βδ). This is robust to controlling for
demographic characteristics.
(1) (2)
Patient Choices Patient Choices
Treatment 2 0.08 -0.07
(0.50) (0.48)
Treatment 3(a) -0.41 -0.48
(0.54) (0.53)
Treatment 3(b) 0.80 0.17
(1.51) (1.46)
Education 0.16
(0.16)
Literate -1.67*
(0.99)
IQ 0.02
(0.13)
Income -0.00
(0.00)
CRRA -0.38**
(0.16)
Hindu 0.78
(1.15)
Constant 3.28*** 3.80**
(0.41) (1.46)
Observations 102 99
R-squared 0.01 0.14
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Figure 4.8: The mean number of patient choices varies significantly across treatments
in the second multiple price list (δ). This is robust to controlling for demographic
characteristics.
(1) (2)
VARIABLES Patient Choices Patient Choices
Treatment 2 0.94** 0.94*
(0.45) (0.51)
Treatment 3(a) 0.37 0.34
(0.50) (0.53)
Treatment 3(b) -2.54*** -2.81***
(0.45) (0.43)
Education 0.31***
(0.11)
Literate -2.09***
(0.73)
IQ -0.14
(0.12)
Income 0.00
(0.00)
CRRA -0.18
(0.16)
Hindu -0.38
(0.72)
Constant 2.50*** 3.61***
(0.36) (1.00)
Observations 102 99
R-squared 0.10 0.16
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Figure 4.9: The mean number of patient choices varies significantly across treatments
in the second multiple price list (δ). This holds specifically only for those participants
with δ < 1.
(1) (2)
δ δ
1(δ > 1) 0.21***
(0.04)
Treatment 2 0.06* 0.05**
(0.03) (0.02)
Treatment 2 ×1(δ > 1) -0.03
(0.06)
Treatment 3(a) 0.02 0.03
(0.03) (0.02)
Treatment 3(a) ×1(δ > 1) 0.06
(0.07)
Treatment 3(b) -0.14*** -0.07***
(0.03) (0.02)
Constant 0.96*** 0.89***
(0.02) (0.02)
Observations 117 117
R-squared 0.06 0.52
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Figure 4.10: This was the handout received by participants in treatment 1
Figure 4.11: This was the handout received by participants in treatment 2
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Figure 4.12: This was the handout received by participants in treatment 3
Figure 4.13: Sample IQ Question
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